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Epistemic game theory provides a formal language to analyze players' strategic choices, 
rationality, beliefs, etc., which enables us to formally explore the hidden assumptions behind 
solution concepts in the classical game theory. In this thesis, we mainly focus on epistemic 
conditions of three game-theoretic solution concepts, namely "mutually acceptable courses of 
action (MACA)" (Greenberg et al. (2009)), "rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE)" 
(Dekel et al. (1999)), and "backward induction outcome." 
    (i) MACA is a unified solution concept for complex social situations where "perfectly" 
rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of 
actions. We formulate and show, by using the notion of "lexicographic probability system 
(LPS)" (Blume et al. (1991)), that MACA is the logical consequence of common knowledge of 
"perfect" rationality and mutual knowledge of agreement on the underlying course of actions. 
(Subjective) perfect equilibrium (Selten (1975). IJGT), rationalizable self-confirming 
equilibrium (Dekel et al. (2002). JET), and (perfect version) rationalizability (Bernheim (1984), 
Pearce (1984). ECTA) are analyzed in the current epistemic approach by varying the degree of 
completeness of the underlying course of actions. 
    (ii) RSCE is a steady state where rational individuals observe the played actions and use 
the information about opponents' payoffs in forming the beliefs about opponents' behavior off 
the equilibrium path. We formulate and show, by using the notion of "conditional probability 
system (CPS)", that RSCE is the result of common knowledge of "sequential" rationality and 
mutual knowledge of the actions along the path of play. Self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) 
(Fudenberg and Levine (1993, ECTA), sequential rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium 
(SRSCE), and sequential rationalizability (Dekel et al. (2002, JET) are analyzed in the current 
epistemic framework by varying the degree of "rationality." 
(iii) We suggest that conditional probability system (CPS) with the strong independence 
property is useful to model players' conjecture in dynamic games, and define a notion of 
"consistent belief" to formalize these conjectures. Subgame perfect equilibrium is shown to be 
the logical consequence of rationality and common consistent belief of rationality (RCCBR) in 






Game theory is a study of strategic thinking which provides a formal language to analyze
decision makers’ behavior in different interactive situations. Various solution concepts (e.g.
iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, Nash equilibrium, backward induction,
etc.) are innovated by game theorists. These concepts are mainly motivated by economic intu-
ition. Epistemic game theory formalizes assumption about decision makers’ rationality, belief
and knowledge in a formal and rigorous way which allows game theorists to explore hidden
assumptions behind solution concepts. This helps us have better understanding of those as-
sumptions’ behavior implications in different games. For instance, rationalizability (Bernheim
(1984), Pearce (1984)) is the logical consequence of common knowledge of rationality (Tan
and Werlang (1988)).
In this thesis, epistemic conditions of three game-theoretic solution concepts, namely “mu-
tually acceptable courses of action (MACA)” (Greenberg et al. (2009)), “rationalizable self-
confirming equilibrium (RSCE)” (Dekel et al. (1999)), and “backward induction outcome,”
will be investigated. All of these solution concepts are mainly defined for extensive games.
To analyze epistemic conditions of them, one common challenge is to model players’ ratio-
nality and knowledge of players’ rationality in extensive games. Two non-standard probability
theories are used in the analysis which will be introduced in following sections.
1.1 An Epistemic Approach to MACA
In chapter one, an epistemic approach to the notion of “mutually acceptable courses of action
(MACA)” is provided. In complex social interactions, Greenberg et al. (Economic Theory 40
(2009) 91-112) offered a unified solution concept of “MACA” for situations where “perfectly”
rational1 individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of
action. In this chapter we investigate epistemic conditions for MACA by employing a non-
standard probability theory.
In particular, we use the notion of "lexicographic probability system (LPS)’ introduced
by Blume et al. (Econometrica 59 (1991a) 61-79) to model players’ beliefs in dynamic games.
1Roughly, a player is cautious if he/she thinks that opponents will make mistake (due to trembling
hand), and hence assigns a strictly positive probability to opponents’ every strategy. A player is rational
if he/she is a utility-maximizer. A player is "perfectly" rational if he/she is both cautious and rational.
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Blume et al. (1991a) presented a non-Archimedean version of subjective expected utility theory.
According to the theory, an agent possesses, not a single probability distribution, but rather a
vector of probability distributions that is used lexicographically in selecting an optimal action.
Such a vector of probability distributions is called a lexicographic probability system (LPS).
A conditional probability system (CPS) can be viewed as a conditional-probability func-
tion which defines a probability distribution on opponents’ choices at every information set,
including those are not reached. The notion of "CPS" is not suitable for characterizing the epis-
temic condition of MACA due to the tension between "perfectly" rationality and knowledge of
"perfectly" rationality. See the following example.
If player 2 is perfect rational, strategy d would be chosen. If player 1 is perfect rational, both
d and f would be assigned positive probability under CPS. If player 1 thinks that player 2 is
perfect rational, probability 1 should be assigned to d. under CPS. There is a conflict between
the player 1’s perfect rationality and player 1’s belief about player 2’s perfect rationality un-
der CPS. To resolve the tension, strategy f needs to be both included and excluded in player
1’s belief. The notion of LPS is designed to handle it. By using LPS, strategy f is assigned
probability 0 in primary belief (the first element in the vector of probability distributions) and
probability 1 in secondary belief (the second element in the vector of probability distributions).
Within a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show that, by using the notion
of LPS, MACA is the logical consequence of common knowledge of “perfect” rationality and
mutual knowledge of agreement on the underlying course of action. In this chapter, we also
demonstrate how epistemic assumptions for various related game-theoretic solution concepts
can be derived by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action. This
study is useful to deepen our understanding of MACA and other solution concepts in the lit-
erature, such as perfect equilibrium, (perfect) rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium, and
(perfect) rationalizability.
It is worthwhile to point out that, by utilizing the notion of LPS, we will present a com-
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prehensive and epistemic analytical framework to accommodate the tension that arises in mod-
eling perfect rationality (that requires to include all possible strategies in a perturbed belief)
and knowledge/belief about perfect rationality (that requires to exclude some strategies from
the perturbed belief) in complex social interactions; cf., e.g., Samuelson (1992 and 2004) and
Brandenburger (2007).
1.2 An Epistemic Characterization of RSCE
In chapter two, an epistemic characterization of “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
(RSCE)” is given. Dekel et al. (J Econ Theory 89 (1999) 165-185) offered a solution concept
of “RSCE” as a steady state where rational individuals observe the played actions and use the
information about opponents’ payoffs in forming the beliefs about opponents’ behavior off the
equilibrium path. In this chapter we investigate epistemic conditions for RSCE from a decision-
theoretic point of view by employing the notion of "conditional probability system (CPS)".
Within a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show that, by using the notion of
CPS, RSCE is the logical consequence of common knowledge of rationality and mutual knowl-
edge of the actions along the path of play. We also apply this epistemic framework to other
related solution concepts such that self-confirming equilibrium (SCE), sequential rationalizable
self-confirming equilibrium (SRSCE), and sequential rationalizability.
1.3 Backward Induction and Consistent Belief
In chapter three, an epistemic analysis of backward induction strategy profile is offered. We
suggest that conditional probability system (CPS) with strong independence property is useful
to model players’ conjecture in dynamic game, and define a notion of "consistent belief" to
formalize these conjectures.
A CPS satisfies strong independence property if it can be generated by an independent
convergent sequence of "full-support" probability distributions over the state space. Moreover,
a player is said to consistently believe an event if he possesses a conditional belief system with
strong independence property and believes the event at the beginning of the game.
Within a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show, by using the notion of
CPS with strong independent property, backward induction strategy profile is the logical con-
3
sequence of rationality and common consistent belief of rationality (RCCBR) in perfect infor-
mation generic games.
4
2 An Epistemic Approach to MACA
2.1 Introduction
In extensive games, Greenberg et al. (2009) presented a unified solution concept of “mutu-
ally acceptable course of action (MACA)” which can be interpreted as an (incomplete) con-
tract/agreement that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse
reasons. As Greenberg et al. (2009, p.93) put it,
“...... a course of action is mutually acceptable if no player would wish, in
his own world, to deviate from it. When deciding on whether or not to devi-
ate from a course of action, every player takes into account that all players
are “rational.” In making their decisions, each player analyzes possible con-
sequences of deviations from the proposed course of action. Players would
be willing to conform to a proposed course of action as long as their con-
formity does not conflict with rational behavior. Observe that each player
may rationalize his expectations in a different way, as long as this does not
violate the common knowledge of rationality as perceived by each player.”
The solution concept of MACA integrates the two main forms of strategic behavior reason-
ings in the game theory literature: (i) players should hold consistently aligned and correct
belief based on behavior specified in a contract/agreement (as in an equilibrium approach) and
(ii) players might hold diverse rationalizable beliefs from introspection on the basic epistemic
assumption of common knowledge of “perfectly” rationality, if there is no code of rules and be-
havior dictated by the (incomplete) contract/agreement (as in a non-equilibrium/rationalizability
approach).2 At a conceptual level, Greenberg et al. (2009) demonstrated that by varying the
degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, the concept of MACA can be related
to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, rationalizable self-confirming equi-
librium, and rationalizability. This approach synthesizes the contractarian and rational-choice
paradigms to study extensive-form strategic behavior through the lens of a contract/agreement,
2MACA is related to Rubinstein and Wolinsky’s (1994) notion of a “rationalizable conjectural equilibrium
(RCE)” in normal-form games where players’ information about opponents’ play is represented by general “signal-
functions.” An RCE is defined as a strategy profile such that each player’s chosen action maximizes his payoffs
given his conjecture regarding actions of the others, and the conjectures are consistent with the player’s signal and
common knowledge of Bayesian rationality; see also Esponda (2012) for more discussions on the notion of RCE.
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with special emphasis on the governance of contractual or informational incompleteness and
asymmetries.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide expressible epistemic conditions for the solution
concept of MACA. A major technical difficulty encountered in dynamic extensive-form game
models is, when facing with strategic uncertainty, how to model a player’s beliefs about op-
ponents’ play in every contingency, including information sets that the player thinks will not
actually arise. Inspired by Selten’s (1975) brilliant idea of “trembles,” Greenberg et al. (2009,
pp.95-98) offered one way to overcome this difficulty by elaborating on a player’s (uncorre-
lated) perturbed beliefs about the behavioral strategies of opponents in extensive games; see
also Dekel et al. (2002). In this chapter, we use the notion of “lexicographic probability system
(LPS)” introduced by Blume et al. (1991a) to model players’ beliefs and provide an epistemic
characterization for the solution concept of MACA.3 More specifically, each player is assumed
to have, not a single probability distribution, but rather an “independent” vector of probability
distributions, on the product of action spaces in the agent-normal form of an extensive game,
that is used lexicographically in selecting an optimal strategy. Such a vector of probability
distributions is called an “independent lexicographic probability system (ILPS).” The first com-
ponent of LPS can be thought of as representing the player’s primary theory about how the
game will be played, the second component as the player’s secondary theory, and so on. Within
a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show that MACA is the logical consequence
of common knowledge of “perfect” rationality and mutual knowledge of agreement on the un-
derlying course of action.
The following example illustrates how to use LPS in our analysis of “perfect” strategic












3Blume et al. (1991b) demonstrated how LPS can be used to provide decision-theoretic foundations for normal-
form refinements of Nash equilibrium. In an interesting paper, Halpern (2009) offered an alternative and intriguing
approach to sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium, and proper equilibrium by using “nonstandard probabil-
ity;” see also Hammond (1994) and Halpern (2003) for the relationship between LPS and nonstandard probability
spaces.
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In this game, it is clear that there is a unique backward induction outcome: (a1, b1, c1), which
also satisfies the “perfect” rationality that every action chosen by a player is optimal along a
trembling sequence. This “perfect” rationality can be represented by lexicographical maxi-
mization in Blume et al.’s (1991a) lexicographic decision theory as follows: (1a) action a1 lex-
icographically maximizes player 1’s expected payoff under a (full-support) LPS on {b1, b2} ×
{c1, c2} – namely ρ ≡
(






(b2, c1) , 1 (b2, c2)
)
,
4 (1b) action c1 lexico-
graphically maximizes player 1’s expected payoff under a (full-support) LPS on {a1, a2} ×
{b1, b2} – namely ρ ≡
(






(a2, b1) , 1 (a2, b2)
)
, and (2) action b1 lexi-
cographically maximizes player 2’s expected payoff under a (full-support) LPS on {a1, a2} ×
{c1, c2} – namely ρ ≡
(






(a2, c1) , 1 (a2, c2)
)
. In this context, the pro-
file (a1, b1, c1) can reflect common knowledge/belief of “rationality” where rationality refers to
lexicographical maximization and knowledge/belief is consistent with the primary belief deter-
mined by the first component of lexicographical probability distributions. (Intuitively, player
1 holds the primary belief that player 2 is “perfectly” rational in the sense of (2) and player 2
holds the primary belief that player 1 is “perfectly” rational in the sense of (1a) and (1b), player
1/player 2 holds the primary belief about that player 2/player 1 holds the primary belief that
player 1/player 2 is “perfectly” rational, and so on.)5
In this chapter, we carry out the epistemic program in game theory to express formally the
assumptions on players’ information, knowledge and belief that lie behind the solution concept
of MACA (see, e.g., Dekel and Gul (1997), Battigalli and Bonanno (1999), Samuelson (2004),
Brandenburger (2007), and Bonanno (2013) for surveys of the literature on epistemic game
theory). In a standard semantic framework (or Aumann’s model of knowledge), we offer an
epistemic characterization for MACA in terms of common knowledge of “perfect” rationality
4Here, ρ represents player 1’s LPS belief (at his first decision node) about player 2’s play and player 1’s play
(at his second decision node). For instance, player 1 has the secondary theory that (b1, c2) and (b2, c1) are played
with equal probability.
5By using LPS, the strategies that get infinitesimal weight can be viewed as being both included (because they
do not get zero weight) and excluded (because they get only infinitesimal weight) in players’ beliefs. This im-
portant feature of LPS is critical in our epistemic analysis of MACA; it is used to resolve the tension between
“perfect” rationality (that requires to include all possible strategies in a perturbed belief) and knowledge/belief
about “perfect” rationality (that requires to exclude some strategies from the belief). Samuelson (1992) firstly
pointed out such a logical difficulty in analyzing the notion of “admissibility” in normal-form games within the
conventional probability framework; cf. also Samuelson (2004, Sec. 9.1). Brandenburger (1992) and Branden-
burger et al. (2008) circumvented the difficulty by using LPS; see also Asheim (2001) for an epistemic analysis
of “proper rationalizability” by using LPS. (In this regard, the notion of “conditional probability system (CPS)” is
not appropriate for an epistemic analysis in extensive games involving “perfectly” rational players, since there is
the same kind of logical predicament in dynamic settings.)
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and mutual knowledge of agreement on the underlying course of action (see Theorem 2.3.1
and Corollary 2.3.1). This result also provides a unifying epistemic approach to other related
game-theoretic solution concepts such as perfect equilibrium, rationalizability, and rationaliz-
able self-confirming equilibrium. In this chapter, we demonstrate how epistemic characteriza-
tions for various related solution concepts can be derived by varying the degree of completeness
of the underlying course of action (see Propositions 2.3.1.1, 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.3.1). In the spirit
of Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) Theorems A and B, we also provide expressible epis-
temic assumptions for a (mixed) complete MACA when mixed strategies are interpreted as
conjectures of players (see Proposition 2.3.1.2).
In an interesting paper, Asheim and Perea (2005) provided, in two-player extensive games,
a unifying epistemic model for studying different “equilibrium” and “non-equilibrium” solu-
tion concepts including “sequential equilibrium/rationalizability” and “quasi-perfect equilib-
rium/rationalizability (where each player takes into account the possibility of the other players’
mistakes, but ignores the possibility of his own mistakes).” In particular, by utilizing a more
general concept of “conditional LPS” to represent a system of conditional beliefs in dynamic
settings, Asheim and Perea showed that the concept of “sequential rationalizability” can be
characterized by common certain belief of “sequential” rationality, and the concept of “quasi-
perfect rationalizability” is the result of common certain belief of “sequential” and “cautious”
rationality.6
Our work distinguished from Asheim and Perea (2005) in two aspects. Firstly, their work
focused on two-person game which avoided the independence issue. N-person game is allowed
in our work. Secondly, quasi-perfectness instead of perfectness was analyzed. In this chapter,
we conduct a systematic epistemic analysis of various perfect-versions of solution concepts
through MACA, by using a strong form of “perfect” rationality that reflects Selten’s (1975)
original idea of perfectness. This idea rested on backward induction is central to a game-
theoretic analysis of rational strategic behavior in dynamic situations. Accordingly, Selten’s
(1975) perfectness requires that each player be “perfectly” rational based on the assumption
that all the players tremble independently among all actions at each information set (including
each of the player’s own information sets).
6Asheim and Perea (2005) took a different “consistent preferences” approach to an epistemic analysis of game-
theoretic solution concepts; see also Asheim (2005) for extensive discussions. In this paper, we adopt the conven-
tional “rational choice” approach in our epistemic study of rational strategic behavior.
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The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains some preliminary
notation and definitions. Section 2.3 provides an epistemic characterization for MACA and
discusses its epistemic relations to other commonly used game-theoretic solution concepts.
Section 2.4 offers concluding remarks.
2.2 Notation and Definitions
Since the formal description of an extensive game is by now standard (see, for instance, Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Kuhn (1954)), only the necessary notation is given below. Consider a
(finite) extensive-form game with perfect recall:











where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the (finite) set of players, V is the (finite) set of nodes (or ver-
tices), H is the (finite) set of information sets, Ah is the (finite) set of pure actions available at
information set h, and ui is player i’s payoff function defined on terminal nodes.
A mixed action at information set h is a probability distribution on Ah. Denote the set of
mixed actions at h by Ah. Denote the collection of player j’s information sets by Hj . A
behavioral strategy of player j is a function, yj , that assigns some randomization yj(h) ∈ Ah
to every h ∈ Hj.
Let Yj be the set of player j’s behavioral strategies. Denote the set of behavioral strategy
profiles by Y, i.e. Y = ×j∈NYj. For y ∈ Y, we abuse notation and denote by ui(y) player
i’s (expected) payoff if strategy profile y is adopted from the root of the game, denote by
y(h) the mixed action of y at h, and denote by y(−h) the profile of mixed actions of y at all






positive behavioral strategies in Yj that converges to yj .
2.2.1 MACA: A Unifying Solution Concept
A course of action (CA) is defined as a mapping x : H → ∪h∈H  Ah ∪ {∅}, with x(h) ∈
Ah ∪ {∅} for all h ∈ H. A course of action can be interpreted as an (incomplete) contract
or a (partial) agreement arising in real-life situations, which may or may not specify an action
in every contingency. The interpretation of x(h) = ∅ is that the CA x does not specify which
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(mixed) action from Ah player i would take at h, where h ∈ H i; otherwise, x(h) specifies
player i’s action at h. In particular, a CA x is said to be complete if x(h) = ∅ for all h ∈ H –
i.e., a complete CA is therefore a strategy profile.
Greenberg et al. (2009) offered the following solution concept of “mutually acceptable
course of action (MACA)” for extensive games where “rational” individuals with different be-
liefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. Denote a subset of Yj by Y j.
Denote by yjk
Y j
 yj a “trembling (belief) sequence” {yjk}∞k=1 generated by convex combination∑m
t=1 λty
j




Definition 2.2.1. A CA x is a mutually acceptable course of action (MACA) if there exists a set
of behavioral strategy profiles Y ≡ Y 1× Y 2 · · · × Y n that supports x. That is, for every player




 yj for all j = i such that
1. for all h ∈ H , y(h) = x(h) whenever x(h) = ∅, and
2. for all h ∈ H i and for all k = 1, 2, ... , ui(y(h), yk(−h)) ≥ ui(ah, yk(−h)) for all
ah ∈ Ah.
In this chapter, we call the supporting set Y in Definition 2.2.1 a “perfectly x-rationalizable”














That is, ℘ (Y j) is the set of “trembling (belief) sequences” which can be used to represent
a player’s plausible “cautious” beliefs about the opponent j’s behavioral strategies at all the
information sets including the ones that the player thinks are impossible, given that the player
knows that Y j is a set of strategies which j might adopt.
The notion of MACA in Definition 2.2.1 provides, through the lens of a contract/agreement,
a unifying game-theoretic solution concept. Greenberg et al. (2009) demonstrated that, by
varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, MACA can be related
7That is, there are an integerm, strategies {yjt}t=1, ...,m in Y j , sequences of strictly positive behavioral strate-
gies yjt,k  y
j
t , and a probability distribution λ on [1, ..., m], such that the behavioral strategy y
j
k, which is




t,k, converges to yj .
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to many commonly used game-theoretic solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, rationalizable
self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes. More specifically, there are three
particular categories of MACA in extensive games:
(i) [The “Complete” MACA] A complete MACA is an MACA that specifies actions
in at all information sets. The complete CA is related to the notion of perfect
equilibrium.
(ii) [The “Path” MACA] A path MACA is an MACA that specifies an action at every
information set that is reached with positive probability if the CA is followed. The
path MACA is related to the notion of rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium.
(iii) [The “Null” MACA] The null MACA is an MACA which does not rely on a
priori information regarding actions at any information set. The null MACA is
associated with the notion of rationalizability.
From this perspective, the notion of MACA serves as a unifying solution concept for exten-
sive games. The following three-person game is used to illustrate the notion of MACA. (For























Fig. 1: A three-person game with a parameter θ ∈ [0, 1].
In the game depicted in Fig. 1, it is easy to see that there are two backward induction (path)
outcomes: c1s2 and c1c2c3, regardless of the valuation of θ ∈ [0, 1]. We consider two cases as
follows.
Case I: 0 ≤ θ < 1. The “complete” MACA yields the set of two strategy profiles {(c1, s2, s3) , (c1, s2, c3)},
which coincides with the set of subgame perfect equilibria. The “path” MACA yields the set
of three path outcomes: s1, c1s2 and c1c2c3, which consists of (rationalizable) self-confirming
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equilibrium path outcomes in Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Dekel et al. (1999, 2002); in
particular, the “path” MACA may generate an outcome that cannot arise in the backward in-
duction solution (because, unlike in equilibrium, players 1 and 2 need not share the same belief
regarding player 3’s behavior at off-path information sets). The “null” MACA yields the set
of eight “perfect” rationalizable strategy profiles – i.e., the whole set of strategy profiles in this
game, which coincides with the set of (subgame) rationalizable strategy profiles in the sense of
Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984).
Case II: θ = 1. Note that player 1’s strategy c1 weakly dominates s1 and, thereby, the
“perfect” rationality requires player 1 never to play strategy s1. Thus, the “perfect-version”
of rationalizability should rule out weakly dominated strategy s1, although every strategy is
still (subgame) rationalizable for θ = 1. In this case, the “complete” MACA remains un-
changed as in Case I, the “path” MACA yields the “refined” set of two path outcomes: c1s2 and
c1c2c3, which excludes the (rationalizable) self-confirming equilibrium path outcome involving
a weakly dominated strategy, and the “null” MACA yields the “refined” set of four “perfect”
rationalizable strategy profiles {(c1, s2, s3) , (c1, s2, c3) , (c1, c2, s3) , (c1, c2, c3)}.
2.2.2 LPS in Extensive Games
Blume et al. (1991a) presented a non-Archimedean version of subjective expected utility theory.
According to the theory, an agent possesses, not a single probability distribution, but rather a
vector of probability distributions that is used lexicographically in selecting an optimal action.
Such a vector of probability distributions is called a “lexicographic probability system (LPS).”
The first component of LPS can be thought of as representing the player’s first order or primary
belief about how the game will be played, the second component as the player’s second order
belief which is infinitely less likely than first order belief, and so on. The agent assigns to
each action a vector of expected utilities calculated by LPS, and chooses an optimal action by
comparing these vectors using the lexicographic ordering ≥lex.
For the purpose of this chapter, we consider the following lexicographic preference order-
ings in the agent-normal game of T .8 Let ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρL) be an LPS on A = ×h∈HAh.
For i ∈ N and h ∈ Hi, an action ah ∈ Ah is lexicographically preferred to another action
8In the agent-normal game, each agent is viewed as a separate and independent player with the same payoff as
in the original game. The agent-normal game was introduced by Selten (1975) for the purpose of defining “perfect
equilibrium”; cf. Kuhn’s (1954) interpretation of how an extensive game is played. See also Harsanyi and Selten
(1988) and van Damme (1991) for more discussions.
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where ρ−h = (ρ−h1 , ρ−h2 , . . . , ρ−hL ) is the marginal of ρ on A−h.9 The LPS ρ−h represents agent
h’s vector-probabilistic beliefs about the other agents’ actions.
Blume et al. (1991b) established the relationship between an LPS and a “trembling se-
quence” in games by using the “nested convex combination”: Given an LPS ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρL)
onA, and a vector r = (r1, r2, . . . , rL−1) ∈ (0, 1)L−1, write rρ for the probability distribution
on A defined by the nested convex combination
(1− r1)ρ1 + r1(1− r2)ρ2 + r1r2(1− r3)ρ3 + · · ·
+r1r2 · · · rL−2(1− rL−1)ρL−1 + r1r2 · · · rL−1ρL.
This nested convex combination operator converts an LPS to a single probability measure. As
rk → 0, an LPS ρ on A can be converted to a sequence of probability distributions pk = rkρ
on A, where ρ is infinitely more likely than ρ+1. Blume et al. (1991b, Proposition 2) showed
that any sequence of probability distributions pk → p on A can also be converted to an LPS ρ
on A by pk = rkρ. An LPS ρ is associated with pk → p, denoted by ρ[pk→p], if pk = rkρ
and rk → 0. An LPS ρ = (ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρL) on A is (strong) independent if there exists rk → 0
such that for k = 1, 2, ..., rkρ is a product measure on A,10 and ρ has full support if for each
a ∈ A, ρ(a) > 0 for some  = 1, ..., L.
The following lemma states a relationship between the lexicographic preference ordering
and the “trembling sequence” used in extensive games. That is, the standard subjective expected
utility along a “trembling sequence” can be represented by a corresponding lexicographic pref-
erence over actions. This result is an immediate implication of Blume et al.’s (1991b) Proposi-
tion 1.11
9The marginal of ρ on A−h is defined as an LPS ρ−h = (ρ−h1 , ρ−h2 , . . . , ρ−hL ) on A−h such that, for  =
1, 2, ..., L,






10Govindan and Klumpp (2002) suggested an alternative definition of independence for LPS.
11It is easy to see that: Lemma 2.2.2.1 implies that ah is a lexicographically best response with respect to
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Lemma 2.2.2.1. Let yjk  yj ∀j ∈ N . For ∀h ∈ Hi and ∀ah, bh ∈ Ah, ui(ah, yk(−h)) >
ui(bh, yk(−h)) for k = 1, 2, ... if, and only if, ah is lexicographically preferred to bh with
respect to ρ[yky].
For Y ⊆ Y, let





where Y j = {yj| (yj, y−j) ∈ Y }. Define
ILPSe(Y ) ≡ {ρ| ρ = ρ[yky] for some yk  y in ℘ (Y )}.
That is, ILPSe(Y ) is the set of all “independent” LPS (with full support on A) generated by
yjk
Y j
 yj ∀j ∈ N . Greenberg et al. (2009) expounded that in the context of extensive games,
when faced with the subjective uncertainty about the behavioral strategies of an opponent j
in Y j , a player’s plausible “cautious” belief about the opponent j’s strategic behavior can be
modeled as a “trembling (belief) sequence” in ℘ (Y j); cf. also Dekel et al. (2002) for the notion
of “extensive-form convex hull.” By Lemma 2.2.1, such a belief can be viewed as an LPS in
ILPSe(Y ).
2.3 Epistemic Conditions of MACA
Following Aumann (1976, 1987, 1995 and 1999), we provide, within the standard semantic
framework, an epistemic characterization of MACA by common knowledge of “rationality”
and mutual knowledge of the underlying course of action. An epistemic model for game T is
given by12
M(T ) =< Ω, {P i}i∈N , {y
i}i∈N , {ρ
i}i∈N > ,
a full-support LPS ρ on A iff, for yk = rkρ and rk → 0 (as k → ∞), ui(ah, yk(−h)) ≥ ui(bh, yk(−h))
∀bh ∈ Ah.
12In this paper, we are mainly concerned with the epistemic analysis of the game-theoretic solution concept of
MACA. We take a point of view that an epistemic model is a pragmatic and convenient framework to be used for
doing such an epistemic analysis; cf. Aumann and Brandenburger (1995, Sec. 7a) for related discussions. See
also Brandenburger et al. (2008) for the epistemic model of type structure with lexicographic probabilities; cf.
Brandenburger (2007) for more discussions.
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where
Ω is the set of states
P i(ω) is player i’s information cell at ω
yi(ω) is player i’s behavioral strategy at ω
ρi(ω) is player i’s vector-probabilistic belief at ω
.
We refer to a subset E ⊆ Ω as an event. For event E ⊆ Ω, we take the following standard
definitions in a semantic framework; see, for instance, Battigalli and Bonanno (1999), Dekel
and Gul (1997), Geanakoplos (1989) and Rubinstein (1998, Chapter 3).
• BiE ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| P i(ω) ⊆ E} is the event that i believes E.
• BE ≡ ∩i∈NBiE is the event that E is mutually believed.
• CBE ≡ BE ∩BBE ∩ BBBE ∩ · · · is the event that E is commonly believed.
Note that the information structure P i may not be partitional; in particular, the belief operator
may fail to satisfy the knowledge axiom: E ⊆ BiE. Since the belief operator B satisfies the
(countable) conjunction axiom: B (∩∞n=1En) = ∩∞n=1BEn, by setting
KiE ≡ E ∩ BiE and KE ≡ ∩i∈NKiE,
we have the following identity:
CKE = KE ∩KKE ∩KKKE ∩ · · ·
= E ∩BE ∩BBE ∩BBBE ∩ · · ·
= E ∩ CBE.
In this semantic framework, we use “believe” to mean “be certain/ascribe (primary) probability
1 to” and we use “knowledge” to mean “absolute certainty/belief with no possibility for any
error”; i.e., an event is said to be known when it is true and believed to be true.13
13The “belief” operator used in our semantic framework can be applied to Brandenburger et al.’s (2008) epis-
temic notion of “assumption” defined in a complete type structure – in this case, “i believes an event E” is
interpreted as “i considers E infinitely more likely than not-E.”
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For E ⊆ Ω, we denote by
y(E) ≡ {y(ω)| ω ∈ E}.
Throughout this chapter, we assume that yi(ω) = yi(ω′) ∀ω′ ∈ P i(ω) – i.e., each player i
knows his using strategy.
We say “agent h ∈ H i is perfectly rational at ω” if we have ρi(ω) ∈ ILPSe(y(P i(ω))
and yi(ω)(h) is a (lexicographic) best response with respect to ρi(ω) – i.e., the contingent spec-
ification yi(ω)(h) for agent h is one of lexicographically most preferred actions with respect to
a vector-probabilistic belief ρi(ω), where the belief that player i holds at state ω, about all the
players’ strategic behavior in game T , should be consistent with i’s information structure at ω.
(For simplicity, we use “rational” and “rationality” instead of “perfectly rational” and “perfect
rationality,” respectively, throughout this chapter.) Denoted by
Rh ≡ {ω| agent h is rational at ω} .
Denoted by Ri ≡ ∩h∈HiRh the event that player i is rational and R ≡ ∩i∈NRi the event that all
the players are rational.
For a given course of action x, let
Hx = {h ∈ H| x(h) = ∅},
and let
Rx ≡ ∩h∈HxR
h and R−x ≡ ∩h/∈HxRh.
(Define Rx ≡ Ω if Hx = ∅.) That is, Rx is the event that the players are rational at the
information sets along the course of action x, and R−x is the event the players are rational
in all contingencies off the course of action x. Denote by χ the restriction of y to Hx, i.e.,
χ(ω)= y|Hx(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Let
[x] ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| χ(ω) = x} .
We are now in a position to present the central result of this chapter which offers an epis-
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temic characterization for the notion of MACA. Theorem 3.1 states that mutual knowledge of
a course of action, “perfect” rationality along the information sets prescribed by the course of
action, and common knowledge of “perfect” rationality at all other information sets, imply the
underlying course of action is an MACA and, conversely, any MACA can be attained by the
aforementioned epistemic assumptions.14
Theorem 2.3.1. (a) Let ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx)∩CKR−x. Then, y(ω) is a perfectly x-rationalizable
profile; in particular, χ(ω) = x is an MACA. (b) Let x be an MACA. Then, there is an epistemic
model M (T ) such that χ(ω) = x for all ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩ CKR−x = ∅.
Proof. (a) For i ∈ N , define
Y i ≡
{
yi(ω)| ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩ CKR−x
}
,
and let Y ≡ ×i∈NY i. Clearly, if x (h) = ∅, y (h) = x (h) for all y ∈ Y . We proceed to show
that Y supports x.
(i) For any i ∈ N and yi ∈ Y i, there exists ω ∈ (K[x]∩Rx)∩CKR−x such that yi(ω) = yi.
Since ω ∈ Rx ∩ CKR−x, ω ∈ R. Therefore, ∀i ∈ N , there is ρi(ω) ∈ ILPSe(y(P i(ω)) such
that, for all h ∈ H i, yi(ω)(h) is a (lexicographically) best response with respect to ρi(ω).
(ii) Let ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩ CKR−x. Since ω ∈ K[x], ∀ω′ ∈ P i(ω), y(ω′)(h) = x(h)
whenever x(h) = ∅. That is, ∀ω′ ∈ P i(ω), y(ω′)(h) = y(ω)(h) for all h ∈ Hx. If x(h) = ∅,
then ∀ω′ ∈ P i(ω),
y(ω′)(h) ∈ {y(ω′′)(h)| ω′′ ∈ CKR−x} (since P i(ω) ⊆ CKR−x)
= {y(ω′′)(h)| ω′′ ∈ CKR−x ∩ (K[x] ∩Rx)} .
That is, y(P i(ω)) ⊆ Y . But, since yi(ω) = yi(ω′) ∀ω′ ∈ P i(ω), we have y(P i(ω)) ⊆
{yi} × Y −i for all ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩ CKR−x.
By (i) and (ii), it follows that for every i ∈ N and yi ∈ Y i, there is ρ ∈ ILPSe ({yi} × Y −i)
such that yi(h) is a (lexicographically) best response with respect to ρ for all h ∈ H i. Thus,




 yj for all j = i such that ρ = ρ[yky] and, ∀h ∈ H , y(h) = x(h)
14Note that, in this paper, “common knowledge of rationality (CKR)” is equivalent to “rationality and common
belief of rationality (RCBR).”
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 yj for all j = i such that (i) for all h ∈ H, y(h) = x(h) whenever x(h) = ∅,
and (ii) for all h ∈ H i and for all k = 1, 2, ..., ui(y(h), yk(−h)) ≥ ui(ah, yk(−h)) for all
ah ∈ Ah. That is, Y supports x. Therefore, ∀ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩ CKR−x, y(ω) is a perfectly
x-rationalizable profile and χ(ω) = x is an MACA.
(b) Let x be an MACA which is supported by Y ≡ Y 1 × Y 2 · · · × Y n. We show a stronger
result that there is M (T ) such that χ(ω) = x for all ω ∈ CK([x] ∩ R) = ∅. For each i ∈ N




 yj for all j = i such that
1. for all h ∈ H , y(h) = x(h) whenever x(h) = ∅, and
2. for all h ∈ H i and for all k = 1, 2, ... , ui(y(h), yk(−h)) ≥ ui(ah, yk(−h)) for all
ah ∈ Ah.





 yj for all j = i. Clearly, ρi (yi) ∈
ILPSe ({yi} × Y −i). Define an epistemic model for game T :
M (T ) =< Ω, {P i}i∈N , {y
i}i∈N , {ρ
i}i∈N > ,
such that Ω =
{
(yj, ρj (yj))j∈N | y
j ∈ Y j , ∀j ∈ N
}
and for all i ∈ N and ω = (yj , ρj (yj))j∈N
in Ω,
yi (ω) = yi, ρi (ω) = ρi (yi) and
P i (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω| yi (ω′) = yi and ρi (ω′) = ρi (yi)}.
Now, consider any arbitrary ω = (yj , ρj (yj))j∈N in Ω. By Lemma 2.2.1, it follows that for all
i ∈ N and h ∈ H i, yi (ω) (h) is a (lexicographically) best response with respect to ρi (ω). Since
ρi (yi) ∈ ILPSe ({yi} × Y −i), ρi (ω) ∈ ILPSe (y (P i (ω))) ∀i ∈ N . Thus, ω ∈ R. But, since
χ(ω) = x, ω ∈ [x]. That is, Ω = R ∩ [x]. Therefore, χ(ω) = x for all ω ∈ CK([x] ∩ R) = Ω.

In Theorem 2.3.1, we have identified epistemic conditions for MACA that are as spare as
possible. An immediate corollary of Theorem 2.3.1 gives a readily expressible form of epis-
temic assumptions of MACA: The notion of MACA can be viewed as the logical consequence
of common knowledge of “perfect” rationality plus mutual knowledge of agreement on the
underlying course of action.
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Corollary 2.3.1. (a) Let ω ∈ K[x] ∩ CKR. Then, y(ω) is a perfectly x-rationalizable profile;
in particular, χ(ω) = x is an MACA. (b) Let x be an MACA. Then, there is an epistemic model
M (T ) such that χ(ω) = x for all ω ∈ CKR ∩K[x] = ∅.
Proof. SinceCKR ⊆ Rx∩CKR−x, Corollary 2.3.1(a) follows directly from Theorem 2.3.1(a).
Corollary 2.3.1(b) follows from the proof of Theorem 2.3.1(b). 
At a conceptual level, Greenberg et al. (2009) demonstrated that by varying the degree of
completeness of the underlying course of action, the notion of MACA can be related to other
game-theoretic solution concepts, such as perfect equilibrium, rationalizable self-confirming
equilibrium, and rationalizability. Theorem 2.3.1 provides a very general and comprehensive
epistemic characterization of MACA which can be applied to a wide range of strategic envi-
ronments. We go on to show how to derive the epistemic characterizations for various game-
theoretic solutions from Theorem 2.3.1, by placing corresponding restrictions on the underlying
course of action.
2.3.1 Complete MACA and Perfect Equilibrium
A complete CA is a course of action x where x(h) = ∅ ∀h ∈ H – i.e., x is a strategy profile. A
complete MACA can be viewed as a “subjective” perfect equilibrium which is “self supporting”
in the sense that, while all the players know that the complete MACA will be followed, it
is possible for different players to have different trembling sequences that converge to this
MACA. A complete MACA is a perfect equilibrium if all the players share the same trembling
sequence that converges to the MACA; cf. Greenberg et al. (2009, Section 3.1). Analogous to
Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) preliminary epistemic observation on Nash equilibrium,
the following Proposition 2.3.1.1, which is an immediate implication of Theorem 2.3.1 for a
complete MACA, states a simple and straightforward epistemic characterization for (subjective)
perfect equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3.1.1. Suppose that x is a complete course of action. (a) Let ω ∈ R ∩ K[x].
Then, χ(ω) = x is a complete MACA – i.e., a subjective perfect equilibrium and, if all the
players share a common prior LPS belief (i.e., ρi (ω) = ρj (ω) for all i, j ∈ N), χ(ω) = x is
a perfect equilibrium. (b) If x is a complete MACA, then there is an epistemic model M (T )
such that χ(ω) = x for all ω ∈ (R ∩K[x]) = ∅.
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Proof. Since x is a complete CA, Hx = H. Therefore, Rx = R, R−x = Ω and y(ω) =
χ(ω) = x. Note that, if all the players share a common prior LPS belief in a subjective perfect
equilibrium, this equilibrium must be a perfect equilibrium (where all the player believe in
the same sequence of trembles that converges to the equilibrium). Proposition 2.3.1.1 follows
directly from Theorem 2.3.1. 
In two-person normal-form games, it is easy to see that the notion of subjective perfect equi-
librium is equivalent to that of perfect equilibrium. Subsequently, in two-person simultaneous
move games, χ(ω) = x is a perfect equilibrium for all ω ∈ R ∩K[x]. However, the following
example depicted in Fig. 2 shows that, for ω ∈ R ∩ K[x], χ(ω) = x may not be a perfect
equilibrium even in a two-person game with perfect information.
1 2 1 2
s1 s2 s3 s4











Fig. 2: A two-person game.
Example 2.3.1.1: Consider the strategy profile x = (c1, c2, c3, c4) in this game. Construct a
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It is easy to verify that, in this example, Ω = R ∩ K[x] and χ(ω) = x is a subjective perfect
equilibrium, but not a perfect equilibrium. (To see this point, assume, in negation, that x is a
perfect equilibrium, supported by a trembling sequence yk  x. For c2 to be player 2’s local
best response to yk, it must be the case that the probability of playing s3 is higher than the
probability of playing s4, i.e., yk(s3) ≥ yk(s4). But then, as yk(s2) > 0, it follows that player
1’s unique local best response to yk at the root of the game is action s1, but not c1.)
In Proposition 2.3.1.1, we hold a traditional view “mixed strategies as objects of choice”:
players deliberately introduce randomness into their behavior. However, a mixed equilibrium
strategy of a player can also be interpreted as the common conjecture of all the other players
about that player’s strategy choices; cf., e.g., Aumann (1987) and Rubinstein (1991). We close
this subsection by providing some epistemic conditions for a (mixed) complete MACA along
this line of interpretation of mixed equilibrium strategies. In the spirit of Aumann and Bran-
denburger’s (1995) Theorems A and B, we present a simple and expressible form of epistemic
prerequisites for a complete MACA interpreted as beliefs: Proposition 2.3.1.2 below states that
mutual belief of all players’ conjectures about a complete (mixed) course of action and of “per-
fect” rationality implies that the complete course of action, which can be viewed as a common
agreed-upon primary belief for the players, is a subjective perfect equilibrium. For the pur-
pose of this analysis, we elaborately require each player i’s strategy choice function yi (·) to be
valued in pure strategies; mixed strategies arise only in the form of subjective beliefs about a
player’s strategy choices. As usual, we also assume that each player i knows his own belief –
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represents the event that all players hold first-order or primary beliefs agreed
upon x – i.e., the marginal primary belief of each player i about the strategy choices of the
opponents is given by the behavioral strategy profile x−i for the opponents – and higher-order















. Then, there is an agreed-upon primary belief
ρ∗1 (ω) = x which is a subjective perfect equilibrium and, if all players share a common higher-
order belief – i.e., ρ∗≥2 = ρi≥2 ∀i ∈ N , the primary belief ρ∗1 (ω) = x is a perfect equilibrium.














= x−i. That is, there is an agreed-upon primary belief ρ∗1 (ω) = x
satisfying (ρ∗1 (ω))
−i = (ρi1 (ω))
−i
∀i ∈ N . Now, consider any fixed player i ∈ N . Let






= x−j and j knows his own using strategy, by ρj(ω) ∈
ILPSe (y (P j (ω))), there exists yk  y in ℘ (y (P j (ω))) such that ρj(ω) = ρ[yky] where
y = (yj (ω) , x−j). Thus, there is yik
yi(P j(ω))
 xi. That is, there exist yit ∈ yi (P j (ω)) for






, where the notation “”





t the limit point arising from such a situation.) Since yit ∈ yi (P j (ω)), there
exists ω′ ∈ Pj (ω) such that yi (ω′) = yit. Since ω ∈ BR, ω′ ∈ Pj(ω) ⊆ Ri. Therefore,
for all h ∈ Hi, yit (h) lexicographically maximizes player i’s expected utilities calculated by












. Therefore, for all h ∈ H i and t = 1, 2, ...,m, yit (h)






By Lemma 3.1.1 below, it follows that xi (h) lexicographically maximizes player i’s ex-













∈ ILPSe (y (P i (ω′)))
15We here purport to present simple and straightforward sufficient epistemic conditions for a complete (mixed)
MACA, which is interpreted as a common primary belief; in particular, we do not need the epistemic assumption
that all players’ conjectures are commonly known as in Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) Theorem B. The
formalism of Proposition 3.1.2 is consistent with Aumann and Brandenburger’s (1995) Remark 7.1 if, for each
player i, ρi is taken to be a single (product) probability measure x on A.
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= ρ[xkx]. By Lemma
2.2.2.1, for all player i ∈ N , there exists a sequence xk  x such that, for all h ∈ Hi and
for k = 1, 2, . . .,
ui(x (h) , xk (−h)) ≥ u
i(ah, xk (−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.
By Greenberg et al.’s (2009) Claim 3.1.1, the agreed-upon primary belief ρ∗1 (ω) = x is an
complete MACA and, hence, it is a subjective perfect equilibrium. Moreover, if there is a
common higher-order belief ρ∗≥2 = ρi≥2 ∀i ∈ N , then the primary belief ρ∗1 (ω) = x is a perfect
equilibrium. 






, then xi (h) is a (lexicographically) best response with respect to ρ∗ =(
x, ρi≥2
)








h ∈ Hi| h′ ∈ Hi s.t. h′ can be reached from h
}
,
where h ∈ Hi (0) is interpreted as a lowest order or 0-order information set of player i from
which no other information set of player i can be reached. Define, inductively, for κ ≥ 1,
H i (κ) ≡
{
h ∈ H i\ ∪κ−1κ′=0 H
i (κ′) | h′ ∈ H i\ ∪κ−1κ′=0 H
i (κ′) s.t. h′ can be reached from h
}
,
where h ∈ H i (κ) is interpreted as a κ-order information set of player i from which no higher or-
der (i.e. κ′-order for κ′ ≥ κ+1) information set of player i can be reached. Clearly, {Hi (κ)}κ≥0
is a (finite) partition of H i since each player is perfect recall. We prove Lemma 2.3.1.1 by in-
duction on the order of κ.
For κ = 0, we show that the result is true for h ∈ H i (0). Since, for t = 1, 2, ...,m, yit (h) is



















(−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.
Since the game is with perfect recall and h ∈ Hi (0) is a lowest order information set for player
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t (h) , xk (−h)) ≥ u















= 0 if ah = yit (h) for






ui(xi (h) , xk (−h)) ≥ u
i(ah, xk (−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.
Now, consider κ = 1. We proceed to show that the result is true for h ∈ H i (1). Since, for


























(−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.








(−h′) |h′) = ui(yit (h
′) , xk (−h
′) |h′)

















for t = 1, 2, . . .m, we can have
























16Note that the conditional expected payoff at an information set from a behavioral strategy profile is well
defined, given that the information set is reached with positive probability when the game is played according to
the specified strategy profile.
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′) , xk (−h
′) |h′).
Since the game is with perfect recall, for t = 1, 2, ...,m, it follows















= ui(ah, xk (−h) |h), ∀a
h ∈ Ah.
Therefore, ui(yit (h) , xk (−h)) ≥ ui(ah, xk (−h)), ∀ah ∈ Ah. Again, by the similar argument
above, we have
ui(xi (h) , xk (−h)) ≥ u
i(ah, xk (−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.
Repeating the argument for κ ≥ 2, we conclude that the result is true for all h ∈ Hi. 
2.3.2 Path MACA and Self-Confirming Equilibrium
A path CA is a course of action, x, that specifies a (mixed) action at the root of the game
and at every information set that is reached with positive probability if x is followed. The
path MACA is related to the notions of “self-confirming equilibrium (SCE)” (see Fudenberg
and Levine (1993)) and “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE)” (see Dekel et al.
(1999, 2002)),17 since they are based on the same idea that the requirement of “commonality of
beliefs” about the actions, which would have been taken in contingencies that were not realized
during the play, cannot be justified and, therefore, should not be required for a solution concept.
The notion of path MACA indeed refines the notion of “sequential RSCE” in which each
17See also Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) and Kalai and Lehrer (1993a, 1993b).
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player is assumed to be sequentially rational at all his information sets (see Dekel et al. (1999,
2002)). Intuitively, the path MACA adopts more stringent “perfect” rationality restrictions
in place of “sequential” rationality used in the definition of sequential RSCE; a path MACA
requires not only that players be “perfectly” rational at information sets along the path of the
play, but also that players commonly know they are “perfect” rational in contingencies off the
equilibrium path.
By restricting attention to a path course of action, Theorem 2.3.1 delivers an epistemic char-
acterization for the path MACA, a perfect-version of rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium.
Proposition 2.3.2.1. Suppose that x is a path course of action. (a) Let ω ∈ (K[x] ∩ Rx) ∩
CKR−x. Then, χ(ω) = x is a path MACA and, hence, it is supported by a sequential RSCE.
(b) If x is a path MACA, then there is an epistemic model M (T ) such that χ(ω) = x for all
ω ∈ (K[x] ∩Rx) ∩ CKR−x.
Proof. Proposition 2.3.2.1 follows immediately from Theorem 2.3.1. 
2.3.3 Null MACA and Rationalizability
A course of action, x, is the null CA if x(h) = ∅ for all information sets h. The concept of null
MACA, which is related to Bernheim’s (1984) and Pearce’s (1984) notion of rationalizability,
is applicable to situations where players have no common background agreement (based on,
say, past observations or social norms) concerning the actions to be taken at some decision
moments. The null MACA suggests an interesting notion of “perfect rationalizability” with
independent perturbed beliefs:
Definition 2.3.3.1. A set of strategy profiles Y ≡ Y 1 × Y 2 · · · × Y n is perfectly rationalizable




 yj for all j = i such that,
for all h ∈ H i and for all k = 1, 2, . . .,
ui(y (h) , yk (−h)) ≥ u
i(ah, yk (−h)) for all ah ∈ Ah.
In particular, y ∈ Y is said to be a perfectly rationalizable strategy profile.
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Bernheim (1984, Section 6(b)) defined the concept of “subgame rationalizability” by us-
ing Selten’s (1965) subgame perfectness criterion, and Definition 2.3.3.1 can be viewed as a
natural “perfect” extension of subgame rationalizability suitable for general extensive games.
In normal-form games, the null MACA yields a rather intuitive refinement of rationalizability,
since perfect rationalizability never uses weakly dominated strategies. Definition 2.3.3.1 is in-
deed Herings and Vannetelbosch’s (1999) definition of “weakly perfect rationalizability” in the
class of simultaneous-move games. As Herings and Vannetelbosch (2000) showed, this notion
is equivalent to the DF procedure (Dekel-Fudenberg 1990) if allowed for correlated perturbed
beliefs.
By applying Theorem 2.3.1 to the case of the null CA, we can obtain the following Proposi-
tion 2.3.3.1 which provides an epistemic characterization for the “perfect” version of rational-
izability. In normal-form games, Proposition 2.3.3.1 is consistent with Brandenburger’s (1992)
characterization for the DF procedure by using LPS.18
Proposition 2.3.3.1. (a) Let ω ∈ CKR. Then, y (ω) is a perfectly rationalizable strategy
profile and, hence, a rationalizable strategy profile. (b) Let y be a perfectly rationalizable
strategy profile. Then, there is an epistemic model M (T ) such that y (ω) = y for ω ∈ CKR.
Proof. (a) Let R denote a “self-evident event in R” – i.e., R ⊆ R and R ⊆ Bi R ∀i ∈ N .





′) | ω′ ∈ R
}
.
Therefore, for every ω′ ∈ R , y−i (Pi (ω′)) ⊆ Y−i. Since ω′ ∈ Ri, yi (ω′) is a (lexicographi-
cally) best response of player i to ρi (ω′) ∈ ILPSe (Y ). But, since ω ∈ R , y (ω) ∈ Y is a
perfectly rationalizable strategy profile.
(b) Since x is the null CA, Hx = ∅. Therefore, [x] = Ω, Rx = Ω and R−x = R. Proposition
2.3.3.1(b) follows directly from the proof of Theorem 2.3.1(b). 
In a “generic” PI game (i.e. perfect-information game) where no two different terminal
18In normal-form games, Borgers (1994) provided an alternative characterization for the DF procedure by com-
mon p-belief of “rationality” (where p→ 1) – i.e. it is approximate common belief that players maximize expected
utility using full-support conjectures; see also Hu (2007) for more discussions. Gul (1996) demonstrated that the
DF procedure can be viewed as a weakest perfect version of τ -theory. Barelli and Galanis (2013) also offered
an alternative and interesting approach to providing epistemic conditions for admissible behavior in (two-person)
normal-form games, including the DF procedure and iterated admissibility.
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nodes generate the same payoff for any of the players, Proposition 2.3.3.1 yields the following
corollary that re-states Aumann’s (1995) central result: In a generic PI game, common knowl-
edge of “rationality” implies the backward induction outcome and, moreover, the backward
induction outcome can be attained in terms of common knowledge of “rationality.”19
Corollary 2.3.3.1. Suppose T is a generic PI game. Let ω ∈ CKR. Then y (ω) is the backward
induction outcome. Moreover, there exists an epistemic model M (T ) such that y (ω) is the
backward induction outcome for ω ∈ CKR = ∅.
Proof. Note that, in a generic PI game, the backward induction outcome is the unique perfectly
rationalizable strategy profile. The result of Corollary 2.3.3.1 follows directly from Proposition
2.3.3.1. 
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In the conventional framework of extensive-form games, Greenberg et al. (2009) presented a
unified game-theoretic solution concept of “mutually acceptable course of action (MACA)” for
situations where “perfectly” rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world
agree to a shared course of action. In this chapter, we have carried out the epistemic program in
game theory to explore epistemic conditions for MACA.
We have established an expressible epistemic characterization for MACA. More specifi-
cally, by using the notion of “lexicographic probability system (LPS)” introduced by Blume
et al. (1991a), we have defined “rationality” as lexicographic maximization through LPS be-
liefs and, within Aumann’s semantic framework, we have formulated and shown that MACA is
the logical consequence of common knowledge of “perfect” rationality and mutual knowledge
of agreement on the underlying course of action (see Theorem 2.3.1 and Corollary 2.3.1).20
19Aumann (1995) used the conventional semantic model of knowledge with standard “partitional” information
structures. Halpern (2001) provided a nice synthesis of the knowledge-based approach to different theories for
PI games in light of different kinds of counterfactual reasonings; see also Halpern (1999). From this perspective,
players in our framework can be viewed as if they used (full-support) LPS beliefs to revise their beliefs about
other players’ strategic behavior when doing such hypothetical reasoning. In a different framework (i.e., a finite
extensive-form type model), Ben-Porath (1997) defined a “weak” extensive-form notion of common (initial) belief
of “sequential rationality” and showed that, for a “generic” PI game, this notion leads to an extensive-form analog
of the DF procedure which does not necessarily imply the backward induction outcome; cf. Dekel and Gul (1997,
Sec. 5.4) for more discussion.
20Feinberg (2005a) presented a “subjective” epistemic framework in a syntactic fashion for describing and
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This chapter therefore provides an epistemic counterpart of MACA in terms of what players
know and believe about “rationality,” actions, information, and knowledge in complex social
environments with emerging a shared course of action.
One important feature of this work is that we take a strong form of “perfect” and “cautious”
rationality that reflects Selten’s (1975) idea of “trembles” in our analysis. The chapter thus can
provide a simple and useful analytical framework for comparing various perfect-versions of so-
lution concepts, from an epistemic perspective, in game situations where players are “perfectly”
rational individuals; cf. Table 1. In this chapter, we have shown how epistemic characterizations
for various related solution concepts can be obtained, in a direct and simple way, by varying the
degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, as well as assuming different epis-
temic conditions to players in the game (see Propositions 2.3.1.1, 2.3.2.1 and 2.3.3.1). In the
spirit of Aumann and Brandenburger (1995), we have also offered an additional epistemic char-
acterization for a (mixed) complete MACA – i.e., a (subjective) perfect equilibrium – if mixed
strategies are interpreted as conjectures of players (see Proposition 2.3.1.2). It is worthwhile to
point out that, by utilizing the notion of LPS, we have presented a comprehensive and epistemic
analytical framework to accommodate the tension that arises in modeling “perfect” rationality
(that requires to include all possible strategies in a perturbed belief) and knowledge/belief about
“perfect” rationality (that requires to exclude some strategies from the perturbed belief) in com-
plex social interactions; cf., e.g., Samuelson (1992 and 2004) and Brandenburger (2007). The
study of this chapter is useful to deepen our epistemic understanding of MACA and related
game-theoretic solution concepts in the literature.
Finally, we would like to point out that, in this chapter, we define “rationality” as lexico-
graphic maximization by “independent” (cautious) LPS beliefs. This formalism is used for
capturing Selten’s original idea of “trembles” in analyzing dynamic strategic behavior. It is
natural and interesting to extend the epistemic analysis of this chapter to MACA by allowing
for “correlated” LPS beliefs. We leave this issue for future research.
analyzing dynamic strategic behavior. The framework is particularly useful for accounting for the subjective
reasoning of players in hypothetical situations. At a conceptual level, this subjective framework models players’
beliefs from an a posteriori viewpoint, while our approach in this paper models players’ cautious lexicographic
beliefs, which can be used in all possible contingencies, from an a priori viewpoint; cf. Feinberg (2005a, Sec. 1)
for more discussions. Feinberg (2005b) also studied, in such an epistemic framework, various solution concepts
based on the subjective reasoning of players about hypothetical events in dynamic games.
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3 An Epistemic Characterization of RSCE
3.1 Introduction
In extensive games, Fudenberg and Levine (1993) presented a solution concept of “self-confirming
equilibrium (SCE)” which arises as a steady state where players correctly predict the moves
their opponents actually make, but may have misconceptions about what their opponents would
do at information sets that are never reached when the equilibrium is played. That is, the no-
tion of SCE is designed to model situations where players have no a priori information about
opponents’ play or payoffs and, when each time the game is played, they observe only the ac-
tions actually played by their opponents along the equilibrium path; cf. also Fudenberg and
Kreps (1995) and Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2009). A particular and noteworthy feature
of SCE is that beliefs about off-path play are completely arbitrary so that players may hold
false and inconsistent belief about off-path play; in particular, the notion of SCE allows play-
ers to use a “noncredible” threats in beliefs about off-path play (see Dekel et al. (1999, Fig.
2.1)). If, however, players can use information about opponents’ payoffs and think strategi-
cally, players should be able to deduce and make use of information about opponents’ payoff
functions and, thus, can alleviate inconsistency in players’ beliefs about off-path play. To fulfil
this purpose, by using Bernheim’s (1986) and Pearce’s (1984) idea of rationalizability, Dekel
et al. (1999, 2001) provided a solution concept of “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
(RSCE)” which refines SCE by requiring a player’s rationality at the player’s information sets
that are not precluded by his own strategy. Dekel et al. (1999) showed that RSCE is robust
to payoff uncertainty in the sense of Fudenberg et al. (1988). Dekel et al. (1999) also de-
fined a stronger concept of “sequentially rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (SRSCE)”
by requiring a player’s rationality at all of the player’s information sets, so that the sequential
rationalizability notion implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information with
generic payoffs; SRSCE is related to Greenberg et al.’s (2009) notion of “mutually acceptable
course of action (MACA)”. Sequential rationalizability is also introduced as a byproduct of
SRSCE which refines rationalizability by imposing optimality at every information set.
The purpose of this chapter is to offer a simple epistemic characterization for RSCE. This
line of study can help to deepen our understanding of RSCE and other related solution con-
cepts from an epistemic perspective. In doing so, a technical difficulty encountered in dynamic
extensive-form game models is, when facing with strategic uncertainty, how to model a player’s
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beliefs about opponents’ play in every contingency, including information sets that the player
thinks will not actually arise. Inspired by Selten’s (1975) idea of “trembles,” Dekel et al. (2002)
defined the “extensive-form convex hull” of a set of behavior strategies to model a player’s be-
liefs about the play of an opponent’s strategic behavior in extensive games; cf. also Greenberg
et al. (2009, pp.95-98) for related discussions. In this chapter, we use the notion of “condi-
tional probability system (CPS)” introduced by Myerson (1986) to represent players’ beliefs
and provide an epistemic characterization for the solution concept of RSCE. More specifically,
each player is assumed to hold an “independent” CPS over on the product of action spaces in
the agent-normal form of an extensive game, which is based on the information along the path
of play.
Within a standard semantic framework or Aumann’s model of knowledge, we formulate
and show that RSCE is the logical consequence of mutual knowledge of actions and rationality
along the path of play and common knowledge of rationality off the path of play (Theorem
3.3.1.1 and Corollary 3.3.1.1). This result provides a unifying epistemic approach to other re-
lated solution concepts such as SCE, SRSCE, sequential rationalizability and sequential equi-
librium; we demonstrate, in this chapter, how various epistemic characterizations for related
solution concepts can be derived by varying the restrictions of rationality (Corollaries 3.3.2.1,
3.3.3.1, 3.3.3.2, and 3.3.4.1).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains some preliminary
notation and definitions. Section 3.3 presents a simple epistemic characterization for RSCE
and discusses its epistemic relations to other related solution concepts such as SCE, SRSCE,
sequential rationalizability and sequential equilibrium.. Section 3.4 offers concluding remarks.
3.2 Notation and Definitions
Since the formal description of an extensive game is by now standard (see, for instance, Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Kuhn (1954)), only the necessary notation is given below. Consider a








whereN = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the (finite) set of players,W is the (finite) set of nodes (or vertices),
H is the set of information sets (which is a partition of nonterminal nodes), Ah is the (finite)
set of pure actions available at information set h, and ui is player i’s payoff function defined on
terminal nodes. A mixed action at information set h is a probability measure on Ah. Denote the
set of mixed actions at h by Ah. Denote the collection of player i’s information sets by H i.
Denote by A ≡ ×h∈HAh the set of actions.
A behavior strategy of player i is a function, pii, that assigns some randomization pii(h) ∈
Ah to every h ∈ Hi. Let Πi be the set of player i’s behavior strategies. Denote the set of
behavior strategy profiles by Π, i.e. Π = ×j∈NΠj. For pi ∈ Π, we denote by ui(pi) player i’s
(expected) payoff if strategy profile pi is adopted from the root of the game. For pi ∈ Π, we
denote by pi(h) the mixed action of pi at h, and denote by pi(−h) the profile of mixed actions
of pi at all information sets other than h. Given pi ∈ Π, let Hpi be the set of information sets
reached with positive probability under pi. Denote by H ipi = Hpi ∩ Hi the set of player i’s
information sets reached by pi and H ipii = ∪pi−i∈Π−iH
i
(pii,pi−i)
the set of player i’s information
sets that are reachable under pii.





of strictly positive behavior strategies
in Πi that converges to pii.
3.2.1 RSCE: A Definition
Dekel et al. (1999) proposed a solution concept of “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
(RSCE)” for extensive games where players learn the path of the play and incorporate the infor-
mation of opponents’ payoffs into the original notion of SCE. Following Dekel et al. (1999), an
assessment ηi for player i is a function that assigns a probability measure over the nodes at each
of his own information sets. A belief of player i is a pair (ηi, pii−i ) where ηi is player i’s assess-
ment and pii−i = (piij)j 	=i represents player i’s conjecture about opponents’ strategies. A version
of player i is a strategy-belief pair vi = (pii, (ηi, pii−i )). Given a version vi = (pii, (ηi, pii−i )),



















where ui (pi|h, ηi (h)) represents player i’s conditional expected payoff given that information
set h is reached, that player i’s assessment is given by ηi(h), and that the strategy profile is pi.
A version vi = (pii, (ηi, pii−i )) is consistent (Kreps and Wilson (1982)) if ηi,k → ηi where
ηi,k is obtained using Bayes rule from a trembling sequence pii−i,k  pii−i. A belief model
V = (V1, V2, ..., Vn) where Vi is the set of consistent versions for player i.
A strategy pii of player i is in the extensive-form convex hull of a subset Πi ⊆ Πi (Dekel
et al. (2002)), denote by coe (Πi), if there is an integer m, strategies {pii,t}t=1, ...,m in Πi,
sequences of strictly positive behavior strategies pii, t, k  pii,t, and a sequence αk → α of
probability distributions on [1, ..., m], such that the behavior strategies pii, k, which is outcome-
equivalent to convex combination
∑m
t=1 αt,kpii, t, k, converges to pii (in this situation we denote
by pii, k  pii ∈ coe (Πi)).
Dekel et al. (1999, 2002) defined SCE, RSCE and SRSCE as strategy profiles. Since only
the path of play is essential in these notions, we give the following alternative definition in
terms of paths of play.
Definition 3.2.1. (Dekel et al. 1999, 2002). Let pi be a path of play. Given a belief model








∈ Vi, we consider the
following conditions for V :
(1) ∀h ∈ H ipii , pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(1’) ∀h ∈ H i
(pii,pii−i)
, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(1”) ∀h ∈ H i, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(2) the path of play resulting from (pii, pii−i) is pi.




where ΠVj = {pij : (pij , (ηj , pi
j




The path pi is a rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE) if there is a belief model V
satisfying (1), (2) and (3), pi is a self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) if there is a belief model
V satisfying (1’), (2) and (3), and pi is a sequential rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium
(SRSCE) if there is a belief model V satisfying (1”), (2) and (3).
Dekel et al. (1999, p.173) demonstrated, through the example of Selten’s Horse, that arbi-
trary and heterogeneous false beliefs about off-path play can lead to non-Nash outcomes: SCE,
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RSCE and SRSCE all can arrive at a steady state that cannot arise in Nash equilibrium. Dekel
et al. (1999, Sec. 4) showed that the notion of RSCE is not robust to the presence of a small
amount of payoff uncertainty in the sense of Fudenberg et al. (1988). The following example
















In this game depicted in Fig. 1, it is easy to verify that the path outcomes of SCE, RSCE and
SRSCE are as follows:
SCE: s1; c1s2; c1c2c3
RSCE: s1; c1c2c3
SRSCE: c1c2c3
For instance, while the path s1 can arise in RSCE by using a “rationalizable” belief that player
2 will play s2 with probability 1 (since player 1’s second decision node is precluded by his
strategy and, thus, there is no rationality requirement for player 1 at this decision node), the
path c1s2 cannot arise in RSCE (since player 1’s second decision node is not precluded by his
strategy in this case and, thus, the rationality at this decision node requires player 1’s choice to
be c3). In particular, SRSCE yields the unique backward induction outcome: c1c2c3.
3.2.2 CPS in Extensive Games
In this chapter, we consider the “conditional probability system (CPS)” on the space, A =
×h∈HAh, of action profiles in the agent-normal form of T . Accordingly, a CPS on A can be
viewed as a conditional-probability function which define a probability distribution on agents’
actions at every information set, including those are not reached. Formally, a CPS µ| on A is a
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function that specifies, for every nonempty subsetB ⊆ A, a conditional probability distribution
µ|B given B and satisfies the property:
µ|B(D) = µ|C(D)µ|B(C) for D ⊆ C ⊆ B and C = ∅.
See, e.g., Myerson (1991, Sec. 1.6). Denote by
A (h) ≡ {a ∈ A : a reaches h}
the set of action profiles by each of which h can be reached. For i ∈ N and h ∈ Hi, ah ∈ Ah










h, a−h) ∀bh ∈ Ah
where µ|−hA(h) is the marginal of µ |A(h) on A−h,21 which specifies the agent h’s belief about
opponents’ choices given that information set h is reached.
By Myerson’s (1986) Theorem 1, a CPS on a (finite) state space can be expressed by a
convergent sequence of “full-support” probability distributions over the state space. A CPS
µ| on A is associated with a probability distribution p (on A), denoted by µ|[pkp], if there
exists a sequence of probability distributions pk → p such that:
(i) For k = 1, 2, ... and every a ∈ A, pk(a) > 0;
(ii) For any B, C ⊆ A with B = ∅, µ|B(C) = limk→∞ pk(B∩C)pk(B) .
For the purpose of this chapter, we say “a CPS µ| onA is independent” if µ| = µ|[pkp] where pk
are product measures on the (product) spaceA; cf., e.g., McLennan (1989) for more discussions.
The following lemma is an immediate implication of Myerson’s (1986) Theorem 1, which
states a relationship between “sequential rationality” and “conditionally preference ordering by
CPS.”
21The marginal of µ|A(h) on A−h is defined as probability measure on A−h such that














Lemma 3.2.1. Let pij,k  pij ∀j ∈ N . For all h ∈ H i, pii (h) is a best response with respect to
a consistent version (pii, (ηi, pi−i )) with pij,k  pij ∀j = i if, and only if, pii (h) is preferred to
ah with respect to µ|[pikpi] for all ah ∈ Ah.
For any subset Π ⊆ Π, let
coe (Π) = ×j∈Nco
e (Πj) ,
where Πj = {pij : (pij, pi−j) ∈ Π}. Written pik  pi ∈ coe (Π) for “pij,k  pij ∈ coe (Πj)
∀j ∈ N .” Define
ICPSe(Π) ≡
{




That is, ICPSe(Π) is the set of all independent CPS onA that can be generated by pi ∈ coe (Π).
3.3 Epistemic Characterization of RSCE
Following Aumann (1976, 1987, 1995, and 1999), we provide, within the standard partition
model, epistemic conditions for RSCE by common knowledge of “rationality” and mutual
knowledge of the equilibrium path. A model of knowledge for game T is given by
M(T ) =< Ω, {Pi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N , {µi|}i∈N > ,
where
Ω is the set of states
Pi(ω) is player i’s information partition at ω
pii(ω) is player i’s behavior strategy at ω
µi|(ω) is player i’s conditional belief systems at ω
.
We refer to a subsetE ⊆ Ω as an event. For an eventE ⊆ Ω, we take the following standard
definitions.
• KiE ≡ {ω ∈ Ω| Pi(ω) ⊆ E} is the event that i knows E.
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• KE ≡ ∩i∈NKiE is the event that E is mutually known.
• CKE ≡KE ∩KKE ∩KKKE ∩ · · · is the event that E is commonly known.
For E ⊆ Ω, we denote by
pi(E) ≡ {pi(ω) : ω ∈ E}.
Throughout this chapter, we assume pii (·) is measurable w.r.t. information partition Pi – i.e.
pii(ω) = pii(ω
′) ∀ω′ ∈ Pi(ω).
Agent h ∈ Hi is rational at ω if we have µi| (ω) ∈ ICPSe (pi (Pi (ω))) and pii(ω)(h) is a
best response with respect to µi| (ω). For every i ∈ N and every h ∈ H i, denote by
R˚h ≡
{




i.e., R˚h represents the event that agent h is robust-rational whenever information set h is not
excluded by his strategy choice. (Apparently, ω ∈ R˚h if h /∈ H i
pii(ω)
) For any given path of play
pˆi, let
R˚pˆi ≡ ∩h∈HpˆiR˚
h and R˚−pˆi ≡ ∩h	∈HpˆiR˚h,
where Hpˆi is the information sets reached by pˆi. That is, R˚pˆi is the event that players are robust-
rational at the information sets along the path pˆi and R˚−pˆi is the event that players are robust-
rational at the off-path information sets.
The path of play under pi can be viewed as the restriction of pi to reached information sets:
pi = ×h∈Hpipi(h).
Denote by pˆi the restriction of pi to Hpˆi, i.e., pˆi(ω)= pi|Hpˆi(ω) ∀ω ∈ Ω. Let
[pˆi] ≡ {ω : pˆi(ω) = pˆi} ,
i.e., [pˆi] is the event that the path of play is pˆi.
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3.3.1 Rationalizable Self-Confirming Equilibrium
We are now in a position to present the central result of this chapter which provides a simple
epistemic characterization for the notion of RSCE. Theorem 3.3.1.1 states that mutual knowl-
edge of a path of play, robust-rationality along the information sets prescribed by the path, and
common knowledge of robust-rationality at off-path information sets, imply an RSCE. Con-
versely, any RSCE can be attained by the aforementioned epistemic assumptions.
Theorem 3.3.1.1. (a) Let ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi) ∩ CKR˚−pˆi. Then, pˆi(ω) = pˆi is an RSCE. (b)
Let pˆi be an RSCE. Then, there is a knowledge model M (T ) such that pˆi(ω) = pˆi for all
ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi) ∩ CKR˚−pˆi.
Proof. (a) For any i ∈ N , define
ΠVi = {pii(ω) : ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚
pˆi) ∩ CKR˚−pˆi},
and let ΠV ≡ ×i∈NΠVi .
Clearly, if h ∈ Hpˆi, pi(h) = pˆi(h) for all pi ∈ ΠV . That is, for all pi ∈ ΠV , pi induces the
same distribution over outcomes as pˆi.
(i) For any i ∈ N, pii ∈ ΠVi , there exists ω ∈ (K[pˆi]∩ R˚pˆi)∩CKR˚−pˆi such that pii(ω) = pii.
Since ω ∈ R˚pˆi ∩CKR˚−pˆi, ω ∈ R˚. Therefore, ∀i ∈ N there is µi|(ω) ∈ ICPSe(pi(P i(ω)) such
that ∀h ∈ Hpii(ω),pii(ω)(h) is a best response with respect to µi|A(h)(ω).
(ii) Since ω ∈ Ki[pˆi], for all ω′ ∈ Pi(ω), pi(ω′)(h) = pˆi(h) for all h ∈ Hpˆi. That is, for all
ω′ ∈ Pi(ω), pi(ω′)(h) = pi(ω)(h) for all h ∈ H pˆi.
If h /∈ Hpˆi, then ∀ω′ ∈ Pi(ω),
pi(ω′)(h) ∈ {pi(ω′′)(h) : ω′′ ∈ CKR˚−pˆi} (since Pi(ω) ⊆ CKR˚−pˆi)
= {pi(ω′′)(h) : ω′′ ∈ CKR˚−pˆi ∩ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi)}.
Therefore, pi(Pi(ω)) ⊆ ΠV . Since pii (ω) = pii (ω′) ∀ω′ ∈ Pi (ω), pi(Pi(ω)) ⊆ {pii} × ΠV−i for
all ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi) ∩ CKR˚−pˆi.
By (i) and (ii), it follows that for every i ∈ N and pii ∈ ΠVi , there is a µi| ∈ ICPSe(ΠV )
such that for every h ∈ Hpii, pii(h) is a best response with respect to µi|A(h). Thus, there exists




such that µi| = µ|[pikpi], and ∀h ∈ Hpˆi, pi(h) = pˆi(h). By Lemma 3.2.1,
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∀i ∈ N and pii ∈ ΠVi , there exists (ηi, pii−i ), which is consistent with pik  pi, such that
























−i ) is consistent with pik  pi
where µ|[pikpi] = µi| (ω)












∈ Vi, we have
(1) ∀h ∈ Hpii , pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(2) (pii, pii−i ) has the distribution over outcomes induced by pˆi.




where ΠVj = {pi′j : (pi′j , (ηi, pi
j




That is, ∀ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi) ∩ CKR˚−pˆi, pˆi (ω) = pˆi and pˆi is an RSCE.
(b)Let pˆi be an RSCE that is supported by V = (V1, V2, ..., Vn).
We proceed to show a stronger result that there is M (T ) such that pˆi (ω) = pˆi for all
ω ∈ CK([pˆi] ∩ R˚) = ∅. For all i ∈ N , for every (pii, (ηi, pii−i)) ∈ Vi,
(1) ∀h ∈ Hpii , pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(2) (pii, pii−i ) has the distribution over outcomes induced by pˆi.




where ΠVj = {pi′j : (pi′j , (ηi, pi
j













. Define a knowledge model for game T :
M (T ) =< Ω, {Pi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N , {µi|}i∈N > ,
such thatΩ =
{(
pij , µj| (pij)
)
j∈N
: pij ∈ ΠVj , ∀j ∈ N
}






pii (ω) = pii, µi| (ω) = µi| (pii) and
Pi (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω : pii (ω′) = pii and µi| (ω′) = µi| (pii)}.
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∈ Ω. By Lemma 3.2.1, it follows that
for all i ∈ N and h ∈ Hpii , pii (ω) (h) is a best response with respect to µi|A(h) (ω). Since





, µi| (ω) ∈ ICPS
e (pi (Pi (ω))) ∀i ∈ N . Therefore, ω ∈ R˚.
But, since pˆi (ω) = pˆi, ω ∈ [pˆi]. Therefore, Ω = R˚ ∩ [pˆi] and, hence, pˆi (ω) = pˆi for all
ω ∈ CK([pˆi] ∩ R˚) = Ω. 
An immediate corollary of Theorem 3.3.1.1 gives a more readily expressible and readable
form of epistemic assumptions of RSCE: The notion of RSCE can be viewed as the logical
consequence of common knowledge of robust-rationality plus mutual knowledge of a path of
play.
Corollary 3.3.1.1. Let R˚i ≡ ∩h∈HiR˚h and R˚ ≡ ∩i∈N R˚i. (a) Let ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ CKR˚. Then,
pˆi(ω) = pˆi is an RSCE. (b) Let pˆi be an RSCE. Then, there is a knowledge model M (T ) such
that pˆi(ω) = pˆi for all ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ CKR˚.
Proof. Since CKR˚ ⊆ R˚pˆi ∩ CKR˚−pˆi, Corollary 3.3.1.1(a) follows directly from Theorem
3.3.1.1(a). Corollary 3.3.1.1(b) follows from the proof of Theorem 3.3.1.1(b). 
This theorem says that mutual knowledge of the on-path actions, robust-rationality along
on-path information sets, and common knowledge of robust-rationality at off-path information
sets lead to “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE).” The “robust-rationality” is
defined only at reachable information sets, rather than at all information sets. In particular, this
“rationality” at off-path information sets does require that each player be optimal at all these
information sets, but it requires only that each player be optimal at the information sets that
are not precluded by the player’s strategy at the state. The epistemic assumption of “common
knowledge of robust-rationality at off-path information sets” can be justified by using the prior
payoff information (cf. Dekel et al. (1999)).
3.3.2 Self-Confirming Equilibrium
In Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1995), players are assumed to
have no a priori information about each others’ payoffs, and only observe the actions chosen
by their opponents. In such an environment, Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) proposed the solu-
tion concept of “self-confirming equilibrium (SCE)” in which players’ behavior is required to
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be optimal only at the observed information sets and players’ behavior at off the equilibrium
path information sets imposes no requirement of rationality. Without imposing any “rational-
ity” restriction on the off-path behavior, we obtain an epistemic characterization for SCE as a
corollary of Theorem 3.3.1.1.
Corollary 3.3.2.1. (a) Let ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi. Then, pˆi(ω) = pˆi is an SCE. (b) Let pˆi be an SCE.
Then, there is a knowledge modelM (T ) such that pˆi(ω) = pˆi for all ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi.
Proof. (a) For any i ∈ N , define
ΠVi = {pii(ω) : ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚
pˆi}
and let ΠV ≡ ×i∈NΠVi .
Clearly, if h ∈ Hpˆi, pi(h) = pˆi(h) for all pi ∈ ΠV . That is, for all pi ∈ ΠV , pi has the same
distribution over outcomes as induced by pˆi.
(i) For any i ∈ N , pii ∈ ΠVi , there exists ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi such that pii(ω) = pii. Since
ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi, ω ∈ R˚pˆi. Therefore, ∀i ∈ N there is µi|(ω) ∈ ICPSe(pi(P i(ω)) such that
∀h ∈ Hpˆi ∩Hi, pii(ω)(h) is a best response with respect to µi|A(h)(ω).
(ii) Since ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi, ω ∈ Ki[pˆi] ⊆ [pˆi]. Then, for all ω′ ∈ Pi(ω), pi(ω′)(h) = pˆi(h)
for all h ∈ Hpˆi. That is, for all ω′ ∈ Pi(ω), pi(ω′)(h) = pi(ω)(h) for all h ∈ Hpˆi. Therefore,
pi(Pi(ω)) ⊆ ΠV . Since pii (ω) = pii (ω′) ∀ω′ ∈ Pi (ω), pi(Pi(ω)) ⊆ {pii} × ΠV−i for all
ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi.
By (i) and (ii), it follows that for every i ∈ N and pii ∈ ΠVi , there is a µi ∈ ICPSe(ΠV )
such that for all h ∈ Hpˆi ∩ H i, pii(h) is best response with respect to µi. Thus, there exists





such that µi| = µ|[pikpi], and ∀h ∈ Hpˆi, pi(h) = pˆi(h). By Lemma 3.2.1,
∀i ∈ N and pii ∈ ΠVi , there exists (ηi, pii−i ), which is consistent with pik  pi, such that
∀h ∈ H(pii, pii−i ) ∩H
i

























−i ) is consistent with pik  pi
where µ|[pikpi] = µi| (ω)













∈ Vi, we have
(1’) ∀h ∈ H(pii, pii−i ) ∩Hi, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(2) (pii, pii−i ) has the distribution over outcomes induced by pˆi.




where ΠVj = {pi′j : (pi′j , (ηi, pi
j




That is, ∀ω ∈ K[pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi, pˆi (ω) = pˆi and pˆi is an SCE.
(b) Let pˆi be an SCE that is supported by V = (V1, V2, ..., Vn).
We proceed to show a stronger result that there is M (T ) such that pˆi (ω) = pˆi for all
ω ∈ K([pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi) = ∅. For all i ∈ N , for every (pii, (ηi, pii−i)) ∈ Vi,
(1’) ∀h ∈ H(pii, pii−i ) ∩Hi, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).
(2) (pii, pii−i ) has the distribution over outcomes induced by pˆi.




where ΠVj = {pi′j : (pi′j , (ηi, pi
j












. Define a knowledge model for game T :
M (T ) =< Ω, {Pi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N , {µi|}i∈N > ,
such thatΩ =
{(
pij , µj| (pij)
)
j∈N
: pij ∈ Π
V
j , ∀j ∈ N
}






pii (ω) = pii, µi| (ω) = µi| (pii) and

















∈ Ω. By Lemma
3.2.1, it follows that for all i ∈ N and h ∈ Hpˆi ∩Hi, pii (ω) (h) is a best response with respect




, µi| (ω) ∈ ICPS
e (pi (Pi (ω))) ∀i ∈ N .
Therefore, ω ∈ R˚pˆi. But, since pˆi (ω) = pˆi, ω ∈ [pˆi]. Therefore, Ω = R˚pˆi ∩ [pˆi] and, hence,
pˆi (ω) = pˆi for all ω ∈ K([pˆi] ∩ R˚pˆi). 
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3.3.3 Sequential Rationalizable Self-Confirming Equilibrium
As pointed out, Dekel et al. (1999) defined RSCE by using robust-rationality. If “rational-
ity” is defined as the conventional (sequential) rationality in the sense of Kreps and Wilson
(1982) – i.e., it requires to be sequentially rational at every information set, including those
unreachable information sets, we can obtain a stronger version of “sequentially rationalizable
self-confirming equilibrium (SRSCE)”; see Dekel et al. (1999, Sec. 4). Denoted by
Rh ≡ {ω : agent h is rational at ω} ,
i.e., player i is (sequential) rational at information set h where h ∈ H i. For any given path of
play pˆi, let
Rpˆi ≡ ∩h∈HpˆiR
h and R−pˆi ≡ ∩h	∈HpˆiRh.
That is, Rpˆi is the event that players are (sequential) rational along on-path information sets
specified by strategy profile pˆi, and R−pˆi is the event that players are (sequential) rational at
off-path information sets.
Corollary 3.3.3.1. (a) Let ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ Rpˆi) ∩ CKR−pˆi. Then, pˆi(ω) = pˆi is an SRSCE. (b)
Let pˆi be an SRSCE. Then, there is a knowledge model M (T ) such that pˆi(ω) = pˆi for all
ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ Rpˆi) ∩ CKR−pˆi.
Proof. R˚h (where h /∈ Hi) has no restrictions on the behavior at the information set h if it is
excluded by player i’s strategy choice. Then, Rh ⊆ R˚h. Corollary 3.3.3.1 follows immediately
from Theorem 3.3.1.1. 
If there is a unique backward induction outcome in a game with perfect information – i.e.
a PI game (which is true for “generic” assignments of payoffs to terminal nodes), then SRSCE
coincides with the backward induction solution since the “rationality” requirement is strength-
ened so that each player’s strategy is (sequentially) optimal at each of his information sets,
including those precluded by the player’s own strategy.
Corollary 3.3.3.2. Suppose a PI game T has a unique backward induction outcome. (a) Let
ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ Rpˆi) ∩ CKR−pˆi. Then, pˆi(ω) = pˆi is the backward induction (path) outcome. (b)
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Let pˆi be the backward induction (path) outcome. Then, there is a knowledge model M (T )
such that pˆi(ω) = pˆi for all ω ∈ (K[pˆi] ∩ Rpˆi) ∩ CKR−pˆi.
Proof. Clearly, pi(ω) is the unique backwards induction outcome if ω ∈ (K[pˆi]∩Rpˆi)∩CKR−pˆi.
The result of Corollary 3.3.3.2 follows directly from Corollary 3.3.3.1. 
3.3.4 Sequential Rationalizability
Sequential rationalizability is also introduced in Dekel et al. (1999) which refines rational-
izability (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984)) by imposing that players behave rationally at
every information set. This is a variant of Definition 4.1 in Dekel et al. (1999).
Definition 3.3.4.1. Given a belief model V = (V1, V2, ..., Vn), let ΠV = ×jΠVj where
ΠVj = {pij : (pij, (ηj, pi
j
−j)) ∈ Vj for some belief (ηj, pi
j
−j)}. Π
V is sequential rationalizable if








∈ Vi, we have
(1”) ∀h ∈ H i, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).





The following result is in align with Tan and Werlang (1988), and sequential rationalizability
is shown to be a logical consequence of common knowledge of (sequential) rationality.
Corollary 3.3.4.1. (a) Let ω ∈ CKR. Then, pi(ω) is a sequential rationalizable strategy
profile. (b) Let pi be sequential rationalizable. Then, there is a knowledge model M (T ) such
that pi(ω) = pi for all ω ∈ CKR.
Proof. (a) Let R denote a “self-evident event inR” – i.e., R ⊆ R and R ⊆ Ki R ∀i ∈ N .





′) | ω′ ∈ R
}
.
Therefore, for every ω′ ∈ R , pi−i (Pi (ω′)) ⊆ ΠV−i. Since ω′ ∈ Ri, ∀h ∈ Hi pii (ω′) (h) is a










such that µi| = µ|[pikpi]. By Lemma 3.2.1, ∀i ∈ N
and pii ∈ ΠVi , there exists (ηi, pii−i ), which is consistent with pik  pi, such that ∀h ∈ Hi, pii(h)




















−i ) is consistent with pik  pi
where µ|[pikpi] = µi| (ω)












∈ Vi, we have
(1”) ∀h ∈ H i, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).





That is, ∀ω ∈ CKR, pi (ω) is a sequential rationalizable strategy profile.
(b) Let pi is a sequential rationalizable strategy profile that is supported by V = (V1, V2, ..., Vn).
We proceed to show a stronger result that there is M (T ) such that pi (ω) = pi for all
ω ∈ CKR = ∅. For all i ∈ N , for every (pii, (ηi, pii−i)) ∈ Vi,
(1”) ∀h ∈ H i, pii (h) is a best response with respect to (ηi, pii−i).













. Define a knowledge model for game T :
M (T ) =< Ω, {Pi}i∈N , {pii}i∈N , {µi|}i∈N > ,
such thatΩ =
{(
pij , µj| (pij)
)
j∈N
: pij ∈ ΠVj , ∀j ∈ N
}






pii (ω) = pii, µi| (ω) = µi| (pii) and
Pi (ω) = {ω′ ∈ Ω : pii (ω′) = pii and µi| (ω′) = µi| (pii)}.
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∈ Ω. By Lemma 3.2.1, it follows that
for all i ∈ N and h ∈ Hi, pii (ω) (h) is a best response with respect to µi|A(h) (ω). Since





, µi| (ω) ∈ ICPS
e (pi (Pi (ω))) ∀i ∈ N . Therefore, ω ∈ R.
Therefore, Ω = R and, hence, pi (ω) = pi for all ω ∈ CKR = Ω. 
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In extensive-form games, Fudenberg and Levine (1993) and Fudenberg and Kreps (1995) pre-
sented a solution concept of “self-confirming equilibrium (SCE)” which arise as a steady state
where players have no prior information about opponents’ payoff functions or strategies, and
each player observes only the actions played by opponents at each round of the game. Dekel et
al. (1999) offered a solution concept of “rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (RSCE),”
where each player observes only the actions played by opponents at each round of the game and
behaves rationally at all of his information sets that are not precluded by his own strategy, as a
refinement of SCE. In this chapter, we have carried out the epistemic program in game theory
to explore epistemic conditions for RSCE.
We have presented a simple epistemic characterization of RSCE. More specifically, by using
the notion of “conditional probability system (CPS)” introduced by Myerson (1986), we have
defined “rationality” as conditional maximization through CPS beliefs and, within a standard
semantic framework, we have formulated and shown that RSCE is the logical consequence of
common knowledge of “robust-rationality” and mutual knowledge of actions along the path.
This chapter therefore provides an epistemic counterpart of RSCE in terms of what players
know and believe about “rationality,” actions, information, and knowledge in complex social
environments with emerging a commonly observed path.
This chapter provides a unifying epistemic approach to other related game-theoretic solution
concepts such as SCE, “sequential rationalizable self-confirming equilibrium (SRSCE).”, and
sequential rationalizability. In this chapter, we have shown how epistemic characterizations for
various related solution concepts can be obtained, in a direct and simple way, by varying the
requirements of “rationality,” as well as assuming different epistemic conditions to players in
the game. For instance, SCE can be formally represented as the result of mutual knowledge of
actions along the path and rationality along the path; it coincides with the motivation of SCE
where each player’s strategy is a best response to his beliefs about the play of his opponents, and
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each player’s beliefs are correct along the equilibrium path of play. The study of this chapter is
useful to deepen our understanding of RSCE and related solution concepts in the literature.
We would like to point out that, in this chapter, we define “rationality” as conditional ex-
pected maximization by “independent” CPS beliefs. This formalism is used to capture the
conventional notion of sequential rationality in Kreps and Wilson (1982). Greenberg et al.
(2009) presented a unified game-theoretic solution concept of “mutually acceptable course of
action (MACA)” suitable for situations where “perfectly” and “cautiously” rational individu-
als with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. When the
underlying course of action is taken as the form of “path of play,” MACA delivers a strong
perfect-version of SRSCE which can rule out weakly dominated strategies. On the other hand,
the "null MACA" can be viewed as a perfect version of sequential rationalizability, called "per-
fect" rationalizability. Chapter one provided expressible epistemic characterization for MACA
by using “lexicographic probability system (Blume et al. (1991a,b)).”
In an interesting and related paper, Asheim and Perea (2005) provided, in two-player exten-
sive games, a different epistemic model for studying both “equilibrium” and “non-equilibrium”
solution concepts including “sequential equilibrium/rationalizability” and “quasi-perfect equi-
librium/rationalizability (where each player takes into account the possibility of the other play-
ers’ mistakes, but ignores the possibility of his own mistakes).” By utilizing a more general
concept of “conditional lexicographic probability system” to represent a system of conditional
beliefs in dynamic settings, Asheim and Perea showed that the concept of “sequential ratio-
nalizability” can be characterized by common certain belief of “sequential” rationality, and the
concept of “quasi-perfect rationalizability” is the result of common certain belief of “sequen-
tial” and “cautious” rationality. As we have emphasized before, the main focus of this chapter
is concentrated on presenting a simple epistemic characterization for the notion of RSCE.
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4 Backward Induction and Consistent Belief
4.1 Introduction
Backward induction (BI), one of the most classical solution concepts in dynamic games, is still
in the center of theoretical analysis today (e.g., Aumann (1995); Ben-Porath (1997); Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2002); Battigalli and Friedenberg (2012); Samet (2013); Bonanno (2013)).
Dated back to Zermelo (1913), the existence of optimal pure strategies in chess game was
proved. In a perfect information game (e.g. chess), the backward induction procedure is simple.
At the last decision node, players choose an action that maximizes their payoff. At the second
last decision node, players take this as given and choose an action that maximizes their payoff.
This procedure continues until the root of the game is reached. The backward induction inspired
the development of subgame perfect equilibrium (Selten (1965)) and perfect equilibrium (Selten
(1975)).
With the emergence of epistemic game theory, theorists are able to formally analyze play-
ers’ knowledge, belief, rationality, etc. Through the analysis, the hidden assumptions behind
solution concepts are uncovered. The backward induction, which seems natural and intuitive,
was found to have logical difficulties when theorists try to epistemically characterize it.(see
Brandenburger (2007)) To implement the BI procedure, players are required to believe in BI
procedure even if there was a clearly observed contradiction of the procedure. Consider the














According to backward induction procedure, Ann chooses Down at the last stage. Taking this
as given, Bob will choose Out at the second stage. Based on these analysis, Ann chooses Out at
the beginning of the game. Let us look at the logic behind it carefully. Ann chooses Out at the
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root of game because she believes that Bob would choose Out at the second stage. Ann’s belief
in Bob’s choice, Out, is deduced from her belief that Bob thinks Ann would choose the optimal
choice, Down, at the last stage. Note that there would be a violation of backward induction
when it is Bob’s turn to make decision as the game should stop at the first stage under the BI
procedure. In other words, Ann believes that Bob believes that she would follow backward
induction at the last stage given his observation of her violation of backward induction at the
first stage.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the epistemic characterization of backward induc-
tion strategy profiles with Bayesian updating belief in a perfect information generic game. It
provides an explanation of Bob’s ignorance of observed violation in the previous example. The
major difficulty that we encounter is how to model players’ subjective uncertainty at every in-
formation set, particularly at those unreached. In this chapter, we use the notion of "conditional
probability system (CPS)" (Myerson (1986)) to model players’ beliefs and provide an epistemic
characterization for the solution concept of the BI strategy profile. More specifically, we de-
fine the notion of "consistent belief" by using CPS with strong independence property. Within
a standard semantic framework, we formulate and show that BI strategy profile is the logical
consequence of rationality and common consistent belief of rationality (RCCBR) in perfect
information generic game. It is important to obtain the backwards induction strategy profile
instead of only the outcome as strategy profiles are the focus of game theory analysis.
In the pioneer work, Aumann (1995, 1996), the epistemic condition of backward induction
was investigated under the knowledge model, where the backward induction outcome is shown
to be the logical consequence of common knowledge of rationality. In Aumann’s framework,
players take the "from that point on" view, e.g. player acts as if that information set is reached
when deciding what to do at an information set. Common knowledge of rationality implies
that at each decision node players ignore the irrationality at previous stage, and believe that
opponents would behave rationally at the subsequent game.
The major critic of Aumann’s result is that there is no belief revision (Samet (1996), Halpern
(2001)). The concept of "initial belief"22 (Ben-Porath (1997)) was developed to model players’
belief and revision process. In Ben-Porath’s model, players have a conditional belief system
that specifies players’ belief at every information set. If a player initially believes an event,
he would assign probability one to this event at the beginning of game, under the conditional
22The original term is common certainty of rationality. We adopt the terminology in Brandenburg (2007) for
convenience of comparison with the notion of "strong belief" (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999,2002)).
49
belief system. Moreover, if there is no contradiction of the initial belief at the subsequent infor-
mation sets, players update their original belief at these information sets based on Bayes’ rule.
Otherwise, players may revise their belief arbitrarily. In perfect information generic games, DF
procedure (Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)), one round of elimination of weakly dominated strate-
gies followed by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies, was shown to be led by
rationality and common initial belief of rationality (RCIBR) e.g. each player initially believes
that each player is rational, each player initially believes that each player initially believes that
each player is rational, and so on. Clearly, DF procedure may result in more than backward
induction outcomes, e.g., (ID, I) in the Example 4.1.
Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999, 2002) strengthened the definition of "initial belief" and
introduced the concept of "strong belief". At those information sets contradicting with initial
belief, players employ forward reasoning to revise their belief. They try to explain the status
quo (contradiction in the previous stage) by players’ alternatively rational behavior. Rationality
and common strong belief of rationality (RCSBR) is shown to be equivalent to extensive-form
rationalizability (EFR), due to Pearce (1984) and Battigalli (1997), which coincides with the
backward induction outcome in perfect information generic games.
However, RCSBR may result in non-SPE strategy profile. The difficulty rises at those infor-
mation sets that totally falsify the rationality assumption. In this chapter, we provide an alter-
native notion of belief operator "consistent belief" and investigate the properties of it (Lemma
4.3.2.1, Corollary 4.3.2.1 and Proposition 4.3.2.1). Moreover, we show that backward induction
strategy profile is the logical consequence of rationality and common consistent of rationality
in perfect information generic games (Theorem 4.4.2).
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. An example is demonstrated in Section
4.2. The framework is introduced in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 provides the formal definition of
consistent belief and an epistemic characterization for backward induction strategy profile. Dis-
cussion and comments on the related literature (Aumann’s model, initial belief, strong belief,
etc.) are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Example and CPS
In this section, we use an example to illustrate how to use CPS in our epistemic analysis.
Consider the extensive game in Example 4.1. Name the first information set as h1, the second






be type spaces for Ann
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1) |A×T = 1 ◦
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and λa (ta1) |A(h3)×T = 1 ◦
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2) |A(h3)×T = 1 ◦
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represents that Ann with type ta2 possesses the conditional
belief 1 ◦
(




at information set h3. A state of the world is a 4-tuple (sa, ta, sb, tb)
where sa (∈ Sa) and ta (∈ Ta) are Ann’s actual choice and type respectively. In the extensive
form game, a strategy-type pair, (si, ti) (∈ Si × Ti) is rational if at every his information set, the
action prescribed by si is a best response to his conditional belief induced by his type, λi (ti).













, Ann is rational, and initially believes that [Bob is
rational and initially believes that [she is rational]], and so on. Likewise for Bob. In other
words, there is rationality and common initial belief of rationality (RCIBR) at (ID, ta2, I, tb2).
However, (ID, I) does not induce a backward induction outcome.
We strengthen the notion of "initial belief" operator by imposing the strong independence
property. A CPS satisfies strong independence property if it can be generated by a convergent
sequence of "full-support" product measures on ×hAh. It is not difficult to verify that λa (ta2)




. A player is said to consistently believe
(CB) an event if he possesses a conditional belief system with strong independence property
and initially believes the event. In the above example, the only state satisfying "rationality and
common consistent belief of rationality (RCCBR)" is (OD, ta1, O, tb1) where (OD,O) is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
4.3 Notation and Definitions
Since the formal description of an extensive game is by now standard (see, for instance, Kreps
and Wilson (1982) and Kuhn (1954)), only the necessary notation is given below. Consider a
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(finite) perfect information generic extensive-form game:






where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the (finite) set of players, V is the (finite) set of nodes (or vertices),
H is the set of information sets (which is a partition of non-terminal nodes), Ah is the (finite)
set of pure actions available at information set h, and ui is player i’s payoff function defined on
terminal nodes. Throughout this chapter, we only consider generic game where the payoffs of
each player at terminal nodes of the game are different from each other. Denote the collection




A strategy of player i is a function, si, that assigns an action ah ∈ Ah to every h ∈ Hi. Let
Si be the set of player i’s strategies. Denote the set of strategy profiles by S = ×j∈NSj. For
s ∈ S, we denote by ui(s) player i’s payoff if strategy profile s is adopted from the root of the
game.
4.3.1 CPS in Extensive Games
In this chapter, we consider the “conditional probability system (CPS)” on the space, A =
×h∈HA
h
, of action profiles in the agent-normal form of T . A CPS µ| on A is a function that
specifies, for every nonempty subset B ⊆ A a conditional probability distribution given B over
A, denoted by µ|B, and satisfies the property:
µ|B(D) = µ|C(D)µ|B(C) for D ⊆ C ⊆ B ⊆ A and C = ∅.
See, e.g., Myerson (1991, Section 1.6).
Denote by
A (h) ≡ {a ∈ A : a reaches h}
the set of action profiles that reach h. For i ∈ N and h ∈ Hi, ah ∈ Ah is a best response with











h, a−h) ∀bh ∈ Ah
where µ|−hA(h) is the marginal of µ|A(h) on A−h,23 which specifies the agent h’s belief about
opponents’ choices given that information set h is reached.
4.3.2 Strong Independence Property
By Theorem 1 in Myerson (1986), a CPS on a (finite) state space can be expressed by a con-
vergent sequence of “full-support” probability distributions over the state space. A CPS µ| on
A is associated with a probability distribution p (on A), denoted by µ|[pkp], if there exists a
sequence of probability distributions pk  p such that:
(i) For k = 1, 2, ... and every a ∈ A, pk(a) > 0;
(ii) For any B, C ⊆ A with B = ∅, µ|B(C) = limk→∞ pk(B∩C)pk(B) .
For the purpose of this chapter, we say “a CPS µi| on A satisfies strong independence
property” if µi| = µi|[pkp] where each pk is a product measure on space Ah × A−h for any



















For any two distinct h, h′ ∈ H , we say that h is a precedent of h′, denoted as h ≺ h′, if
A (h′) ⊆ A (h). Define h ⊀ h′ as h is not a precedent of h′. Then, we have the following
lemma.




A(h) for h′ ∈ H
where h′ ⊀ h.
23The marginal of µ|A(h) on A−h is defined as probability measure on A−h such that













24It should be noticed that the strong independence property is different from independence property
in Definition 2.1 Battigalli (1996). Under their definition, the conditional probability measure specified
by CPS at each information set is a product measure on strategy space, ×jSj .
Proposition 3.3 shows that CPS with strong independence property specifies a product measure on
action space, ×hAh, at each information set as a conditional belief.
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Proof. Let pk  p be product measures on space Ah × A−h for any h ∈ H such that
µi| = µi|[pkp]. Let h ∈ Hi and h′ ∈ H such that h′ ⊀ h.
Pick a ∈ A randomly, and we have











































Note that A (h) = ×h′′Ah
′′
































































































































































With Lemma 4.3.2.1, we have the following corollary immediately.





h′′ ∈ H with h′′ ≺ h and h′′ ≺ h′.
The following proposition says that if µ| satisfies strong independence property, the condi-
tional belief at every information set specified under µ| is a product measure on A.







for any h ∈ Hi and a ∈ A.
Proof. It is trivial if a /∈ A (h). Hence, we only consider the case that a ∈ A (h).
Letm be the number of information set in the game. Index all the information as h1, h2, . . . , hm.
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(⇒) Let Hp ⊆ H such that ∀h′′ ∈ Hp, h′′ ≺ h.






































Since it is a PI game, there is a unique path to h. That is,



























































= 1 for all h′′ ≺ h. Then,

































Proof. Let a ∈ A. Let m be the number of information set in the game. Index all the
information as h1, h2, . . . , hm.




























































































Remark. The reverse of Proposition 4.3.2.1 is not true. In the example 4.1, Bob’s second









|A×T = 1 ◦
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|A(h2)×T = 1 ◦
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| does not satisfy strong independence property.
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4.4 Epistemic Characterization of Backward Induction
4.4.1 Type Structure and Consistent Belief Operator







Let Ti be the finite set of types of player i. Members of Ti are called player i’s types. Denote by
T ≡ ×j∈NTj the set of type profiles. Denote by ∆∗ (S × T ) the set of conditional probability
systems defined overA×T .25 Denote by∆∗◦ (S × T ) the set of conditional probability systems
where the marginal of CPS on A satisfies strong independence property26.
Definition 4.4.1. A {Sj}j∈N -based type structure is a structure
〈S1, ..., Sn, T1, ..., Tn, λ1, ..., λn〉
where for all i ∈ N , λi : Ti → ∆∗ (S × T ). Members of S × T , are called states of the world.
Fix i ∈ N , and an event E ⊆ S × T . We say player i consistently believes E at ti if
λi (ti) | ∈ ∆∗◦ (S × T ) and λi (ti) |A×T (E) = 1, and write
CBi (E) ≡ {ti ∈ Ti : λi (ti) | ∈ ∆
∗◦ (S × T ) and λi (ti) |A×T (E) = 1} .
Throughout this chapter, we assume that player i knows his own type, i.e., CBi (E) ⊆projTiE.
For any h ∈ Hi, denote by si (h) (∈ Ah) the action of player i at information set h prescribed
by strategy si. Player i is rational at (si, ti) if for any h ∈ Hi, si (h) is a best response with
respect to margA (λi (ti) |). Denoted by
Ri ≡ {(si, ti) ∈ Si × Ti : Player i is rational at (si, ti)} .
25We abuse the notation, and define the CPS on S × T as a CPS on A× T . For any E ⊆ S × T , the
µ|A×T (E) is defined in the usual sense.
26For any CPS µ| in∆∗◦ (S × T ), denote the marginal of it on A as a new CPS µ′| defined over A. µ′|
satisfies the strong independence property.
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i ∩ [Si × CBi (R
m)] .






, say there is rationality and common consistent belief
of rationality (RCCBR) at this state.
4.4.2 Characterization of BI
We are now in a position to present the central result of this chapter which offers an epistemic
characterization for the notion of backward induction. Recall that in perfect information generic
games, there is only one subgame perfect equilibrium which is the unique backward induction
strategy profile. Theorem 4.4.2 states that rationality and common consistent belief of rational-
ity (RCCBR) implies the underlying strategy profile is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE) in the perfect information generic game, and conversely, any SPE can be attained by the
aforementioned epistemic assumptions.
Theorem 4.4.2. In a perfect information generic game,
(a) Fix a type structure
〈S1, ..., Sn, T1, ..., Tn, λ1, ..., λn〉 .






. Then, s is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
(b) Let s∗ be the subgame perfect equilibrium. There is a type structure model M (Γ) such














We want to show s = s∗.
Let
Hi (0) ≡ {h ∈ Hi : h
′ ∈ Hi s.t. h′ can be reached from h} ,
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where h ∈ Hi (0) is interpreted as a lowest order or 0-order information set of player i from
which no other information set of player i can be reached. Define, inductively, for κ ≥ 1,
Hi (κ) ≡
{
h ∈ Hi\ ∪
κ−1
κ′=0 Hi (κ
′) : h′ ∈ Hi\ ∪
κ−1
κ′=0 Hi (κ
′) s.t. h′ can be reached from h
}
,
where h ∈ Hi (κ) is interpreted as an κ-order information set of player i from which no higher
order (i.e. κ′-order for κ′ ≥ κ + 1) information set of player i can be reached. Clearly,
{Hi (κ)}κ≥0 is a (finite) partition of Hi since each player is perfect recall. We prove s = s∗ by
induction on the order of κ.







, (si, ti) ∈ ∩∞m=1R
m
i for some ti ∈ Ti. That is, (si, ti) ∈ Ri. Then,




. Since h ∈ Hi (0) and it is a generic game,
si (h) = s
∗
i (h).
Now, consider κ = 1. We proceed to show that for every i ∈ N , si (h) = s∗i (h) for
h ∈ Hi (1). As shown in the last step, for all j ∈ N and h′ ∈ Hj (0), sj (h′) = s∗j (h′). Since
(si, ti) ∈ ∩∞m=1R
m
i , ti ∈ CBiR. That is, margAh′ (λi (ti) |A×T ) = 1 ◦ s∗ (h′) for all h′ ∈ H (0).





= margAh′ (λi (ti) |A×T )
= 1 ◦ s∗ (h′) .




. Since it is a generic
game, si (h) = s∗i (h).
Repeating the argument for κ ≥ 2, we conclude that s (h) = s∗ (h) for all h.
(b)Fix a subgame perfect equilibrium s∗. For each i ∈ N , let Ti ≡ {ti} where λi (ti) ∈
∆∗◦ (S × T ) and λi (ti) |A×T = 1 ◦ (s∗, t). We have constructed the type structure
〈S1, ..., Sn, T1, ..., Tn, λ1, ..., λn〉 .
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Clearly, Ri = {s∗i} × Ti for all i ∈ N . Then, CBi (R) = Ti and






= {s∗i } × Ti ∩ [Si × Ti]
= {s∗i } × Ti.








In this section, we are going to discuss and comment on the related literature. The current
framework will be compared with Aumann’s model (1995). Moreover, the relationship among
the notion of "consistent belief", "initial belief" (Ben-Porath (1997)) and "strong belief" (Bat-
tigalli and Siniscalchi (2002)) will be analyzed. Lastly, the rationality and common consistent
belief of rationality is related to sequential rationalizability, SRSCE and "null MACA".
4.5.1 Aumann’s Framework
Aumann (1995) provided the first epistemic characterization of backward induction. It shows
that backward induction outcome is a logical consequence of common knowledge of rational-
ity. In his model, every player initially believes that all players will choose behave rationally
at every information set. Moreover, every player will stick to their belief about opponents’
rationality at all information set, particularly at those information sets reached by opponents’
suboptimal actions. In other words, even if there was an observed contradiction of opponent’s
rationality, players will ignore this contradiction and still assume the rationality of opponents.
Aumann (1996) section 9 enriched his original model by adding belief system explicitly.
Each player has a belief system which specifies player’s belief at his every information set. A
player is said to be Bayesian rational if he maximizes his (expected) payoff given the belief at
all his information sets. Moreover, players take the "from that point on" view. It says if players
know something at the beginning of the game, they will believe it at all subsequent information
sets. With the belief system, Aumann (1995) showed that backward induction is the result of
common knowledge of Bayesian rationality.
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The major critic of these two treatments is that there is no belief revision process (Halpern
1999), to justify why they would maintain their belief even if there is a contradiction. However,
our work give a possible explanation of Aumann’s result with Bayesian updating. Particularly,
the belief system in Aumann (1996) can be viewed as a independent conditional probability
system in our model, which is used to characterize BI strategy profile.
4.5.2 Initial Belief and Strong Belief
Ben-Porath (1997) introduced the notion of "initial belief", and showed that the rationality and
common initial belief of rationality (RCIBR) is characterized by DF procedure (Dekel and
Fudenberg (1990)), e.g. one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed
by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies. As shown in the example 4.1 and
section 4.2, backward induction may not be the only result led by RCIBR. This is because the
initial belief operator only puts the restriction on belief revision at information sets reached
with positive probability. It means that at information sets that contradict with the initial belief,
players may arbitrarily revise their beliefs.
In the spirit of forward reasoning, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) strengthened the defin-
ition by providing the strong belief operator. Strong belief of rationality says when there is a
contraction between the initial belief and the observation at some subsequent information sets,
players will have a second thought at these information sets and try to find out the reason to
rationalize why such a behavior, e.g. why these information sets are reached before revising the
beliefs. In other words, only at informations sets that totally falsify the rationality assumption,
players will arbitrarily revise their beliefs. With the strong belief operator, backward induction
outcomes is shown to be the logical consequence of rationality and common strong belief of
rationality (RCSBR) in generic PI game. Although strong belief provides the desired belief















In example 4.2, if Bob strongly believes that Ann is rational, he cannot find out a belief
about her belief to justify her choice of In at the first node. In this case, Bob may believe
that she would choose Across at the third stage, and hence choose In at the second stage.
((Out,Down) , In), which leads to BI outcome, is not a BI strategy profile.
4.5.3 Sequential Rationalizability, SRSCE and MACA
The path mutually acceptable courses of action (MACA) is a perfect version of sequential ra-
tionalizable self-confirming equilibrium (SRSCE), and the latter one is the logical consequence
of common knowledge of rationality and mutual knowledge of players’ action along the path.
Players’ belief at SRSCE is a CPS generated by independent trembling sequence of players’
behavior strategies. Together with the Theorem 4.4.2, we conclude that SRSCE is a backward
induction strategy profile in PI generic game.
Moreover, "null MACA", which is the result of common knowledge of (perfect) rationality
(Chapter 2 Proposition 2.3.3.1. and Corollary 2.3.3.1), can be viewed as a "perfect" rationaliz-
ability which is a refinement of sequential rationalizability (Dekel et. al (1999)). Meanwhile,
the notion of "sequential rationalizability" is the logical consequence of common knowledge of
"sequential" rationality (Chapter 3 Corollary 3.3.4.1). Both of them lead to backward induction
in PI generic game.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
Throughout this chapter, we develop "strong independence property" for a conditional probabil-
ity system. Based on this concept, we define the notion of "consistent belief" which strengthens
the notion of "initial belief" (Ben-Porath (1997)). Within a standard semantic framework, we
formulate and show backward induction strategy profile is the logical consequence of rationality
and common consistent belief of rationality in a perfect information generic game.
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